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INTRODUCTION 
Are your honors of a mind now 
That we all be left behind now? 
That we all can have no ticket, 
Having been caught in legal thicket, 
And are lost in legal brambles,  
While the train we want to get on 
Rolls out straight for Armageddon? 
— “A [deservedly] obscure rhymester, whose verses will be  
remembered when Virgil is forgotten—and not till then”1   
 
In the heat of the 2008 election season—following the new tradition of the 
2000 and 2004 elections2—candidates, political parties, and others filed new 
lawsuits practically every day over election law issues. The issues ranged from 
candidate ballot access3  to the allocation of voting machines by precinct4  to 
the accuracy of state voter registration databases.5  In mid-September 2008, 
1. Nance v. Kearbey, 158 S.W. 629, 630 (Mo. 1913) (original emphasis and original 
bracketed material). 
2.  Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 958 (2005) 
[hereinafter Hasen, Beyond the Margin]; Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. 
Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2007) [hereinafter Hasen, Untimely Death].  
3. See In re Substitute Nomination Certificate of Barr, 956 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2008), aff’d, 958 A.2d 1045 (Pa. 2008); see also Ben Adler, Nader, Barr Muscle onto the 
Nov. Ballots, POLITICO, Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.politico.com/news/ 
stories/0908/13595.html (“On Monday [Libertarian presidential candidate Bob] Barr 
defeated a court challenge from a Republican Party official in Pennsylvania who argued that 
the Libertarian Party had improperly substituted Barr’s name for another candidate’s who 
had been submitted earlier. It was the only state where Republicans have challenged him.”). 
4. Complaint at 3, Va. State Conference of NAACP v. Kaine, No. 2:08CV508 (E.D. 
Va. Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ 
litigation/virginianaacpv.kaine.php. The case was voluntarily dismissed after the election.  
5. The case over the Ohio Secretary of State’s refusal to produce a list of mismatches 
Electronic copy available at: ht ps: /ssrn.co /abstract=1344476
HASEN 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/1/2009 10:48 PM 
December 2009] THE DEMOCRACY CANON 71 
                                                                                                                                      
two Ohio controversies garnered national attention. In one case, Republicans 
filed suit to block first-time Ohio voters from registering to vote and casting an 
early in-person absentee ballot at the same time during an apparent five-day 
statutory overlap between the dates for voter registration and for early voting.6  
In another case, Republicans sued the Democratic Ohio Secretary of State, 
Jennifer Brunner, for her refusal to accept absentee ballot requests submitted by 
voters who filled out a form sent to them by the McCain campaign unless the 
voter had checked a box confirming the voter was qualified to vote. The box, 
mistakenly added by the McCain campaign, was not required under Ohio law.7 
My initial reaction to the lawsuits—before I had chance to examine the 
relevant Ohio statutes—was that Republicans should lose the first case and win 
the second. That is, I entered into the statutory analysis with a thumb on the 
scale in favor of voter enfranchisement, which could be overcome only by clear 
statutory language to the contrary or strong competing policy reasons. 
Eventually, the Ohio Supreme Court, relying on such a canon of construction 
favoring voters, indeed sided with the voters in both cases.8 
This “Democracy Canon” of statutory construction, as I call it, has long 
and broad support in state courts, from cases in the 1800s through those 
decided in the 2008 election season. But it has been ignored by Legislation and 
Election Law scholars and appears to have no independent vitality in federal 
courts. Its origins trace back to at least 1885. In that year, the Supreme Court of 
Texas declared in Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett that “[a]ll statutes tending to 
limit the citizen in his exercise of [the right of suffrage] should be liberally 
construed in his favor.”9  The Owens court rejected an argument by one of the 
candidates in an election contest that ballots marked with information such as 
the name and address of the president and vice-president or the counties in 
which presidential electors resided should not be counted because they violated 
a state statute barring the counting of ballots containing pictures, signs, 
between state voter registration databases and the statewide motor vehicle database went all 
the way to the United States Supreme Court a few days before Election Day. The Court held 
that the Ohio Republican Party could not sue the secretary for her alleged failure to follow a 
provision of the Help America Vote Act regarding database mismatches because the party 
was unlikely to be able to prove that the statute created a private right of action. Brunner v. 
Ohio Republican Party, 129 S. Ct. 5 (2008). 
6.  State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 896 N.E.2d 979 (Ohio 2008). There was also a 
federal case, and the federal district court abstained from ruling on the issue following the 
Ohio state ruling. See Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, No. 2:08-cv-00913 (S.D. Ohio 
Sept. 29, 2008), available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ORP-Order2-9-29-08.pdf. 
7. State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner, 899 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 2008). 
8. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. By “canon,” I mean an interpretive 
rule adopted by courts as a guide toward interpreting statutes. I am not using “canon” in the 
different sense to connote a body of cases that should be considered a representative core of 
a concept. On the latter meaning, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and 
the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000). 
9. Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 1885 WL 7221, at *7 (1885). 
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vignettes, stamp marks, or devices.10 
Since Owens, the Democracy Canon has been applied primarily in three 
contexts: vote counting cases, in which someone relies upon the Canon to 
argue, following an election, for the counting of ballots that have not been 
counted because of minor voter error, election official error, or a disputed 
reading of a relevant statute; voter eligibility/registration cases, in which 
someone relies upon the Canon to argue, before an election, that a voter or 
certain group of voters who have been told they cannot vote should be allowed 
to cast a ballot that will be counted even though election officials have 
determined they cannot register or vote because of minor voter error, election 
official error, or a disputed reading of a relevant statute; and candidate/party 
competitiveness cases, in which a candidate or political party relies upon the 
Canon (and particularly upon the voters’ right to vote in a competitive election) 
to argue, before an election, that a certain candidate or party should be allowed 
to run in an election or appear on an election ballot, even though election 
officials have excluded the candidate or party from the ballot because of minor 
candidate or party error, election official error, or a disputed reading of a 
relevant statute. Vote counting cases are the most prevalent type of cases 
relying on the Democracy Canon, but the Canon has been deployed in all three 
kinds of cases across a number of states over more than a century. 
Despite its pedigree, controversy has surrounded the Democracy Canon, or 
at least surrounded the results of the Canon’s application in some recent high-
profile election law cases. In New Jersey Democratic Party v. Samson,11  a 
unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the Democracy Canon to 
allow Democrats to replace the name of U.S. Senator Robert Torricelli on the 
general election ballot shortly before he was up for reelection to the Senate. 
The relevant New Jersey statute contained rules for the party to replace 
withdrawn candidates on the ballot when the withdrawal occurred at least fifty-
one days before the election, but Torricelli, facing an ethics scandal, withdrew 
fewer than fifty-one days prior. 
In Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris,12  the Florida Supreme 
Court relied on the Democracy Canon to, among other things, extend the time 
for a manual recount of votes during the election protest brought by Al Gore 
against George Bush in the Florida 2000 presidential election. Bush appealed 
the decision to extend the time for the protest to the United States Supreme 
Court, which remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether 
the Florida court’s reliance on the Canon, embodied in the Florida constitution, 
violated Article II of the United States Constitution.13  The issue reemerged in 
10. Id. 
11. 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2002). 
12. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000). 
13. As discussed in Part IV below, those proceedings were later mooted by the second 
U.S. Supreme Court decision on the Florida controversy, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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Bush v. Gore, 14  when three concurring Justices determined that the Florida 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida election statutes in light of the 
Democracy Canon “impermissibly distorted [the statutes] beyond what a fair 
reading required, in violation of Article II.”15 
This Article defends the Democracy Canon and argues for its expansion to 
statutory interpretation cases in federal courts, or at least its acceptance in 
federal courts as a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation by state courts. 
This Article nonetheless recognizes that the Canon’s use raises some dangers 
of exacerbating the actuality and appearance of the politicization of the 
judiciary and, in some cases, some knotty federalism questions. It suggests that 
state legislatures, rather than federal courts, are the institutional actors best 
situated to rein in potential state court overreaching. 
Part I briefly traces the history of the Democracy Canon in state and 
federal courts. It explains that state courts have applied the Canon either as a 
tie-breaker or as a clear statement rule, and discusses a now-declining split in 
the courts over the Canon’s application to absentee ballot statutes. It also 
considers the Canon’s reach to the three types of cases described above. Part I 
concludes by noting the Canon’s potential importance given the explosion of 
election law litigation, especially in state courts, since 2000. As my empirical 
analysis shows, the lion’s share of state court election litigation raises issues of 
statutory interpretation. 
Part II defends the Democracy Canon. It argues that many of the 
arguments against the use of substantive canons16  generally do not apply 
against the Democracy Canon. Moreover, the Canon serves two important 
purposes. First, as with some other substantive canons, the Democracy Canon 
can help protect an underenforced constitutional norm. In this case, the Canon 
protects constitutional equal protection rights in voting, rights which courts for 
various reasons have declined to protect directly through constitutional 
litigation. Second, the Democracy Canon is a preference-eliciting mechanism. 
A clear statement rule requires the legislature to take affirmative steps to 
express its intent to limit voter enfranchisement only when justified by other 
important interests. Part II concludes by arguing that both state and federal 
courts should rely on the Canon, despite the different institutional contexts. 
Part III explores the politicization issue arising from use of the Democracy 
Canon through a closer examination of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
Samson opinion. It contrasts the New Jersey Supreme Court’s use of the 
Democracy Canon in Samson with the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of a 
federalism canon in Gregory v. Ashcroft. 17  Relying on a federalism canon, the 
Gregory Court refused to read the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as 
14. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
15. Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.). 
16. On the definition of substantive canons, along with various critiques, see infra Part 
II. 
17. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1344476
HASEN 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/1/2009 10:48 PM 
74 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:69 
trumping a Missouri state constitutional provision requiring state judges to 
retire at age 70. Both cases employed a substantive canon—and in particular a 
super-strong clear statement rule—to reach an interpretation that was not 
necessarily in line with the most natural reading of the statute under 
consideration but one, that is defensible on policy grounds, assuming 
acceptance of the underlying policy.  
Part III uses Samson to illustrate that the use of canons in election law 
cases is bound to be more controversial and highly salient than their use in 
garden-variety statutory interpretation cases such as Gregory. Substantive 
canons may be employed regularly as a tool of statutory interpretation, but the 
public does not generally pay attention to, much less understand, the 
prevalence of their use. In the context of a hot-button election law case, a 
court’s use of a substantive canon may appear illegitimate and result-oriented. 
Moreover, because of the political stakes, judges may subconsciously rely on 
the Canon in ways consistent with their political preferences. For this latter 
problem, this Article suggests that judges be sensitive to the problem, but not 
abandon the Democracy Canon. State legislatures, through the passing of clear 
rules, are best positioned ex ante to avoid judicial overreaching. 
Finally, Part IV of this Article examines constitutional questions arising 
when a federal court is asked to overturn a state court’s use of the Democracy 
Canon. When a state court construes a state statute on a question in a federal 
election (as in Samson or Palm Beach County Canvassing Board) it runs the 
risk of violating either Article II of the U.S. Constitution (vesting in each state 
legislature the power to set the rules for choosing presidential electors) or 
Article I, section 4 (vesting in each state legislature the power to set the rules 
for choosing members of Congress, at least to the extent Congress has not set 
such rules). In Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the Court left open the 
issue whether broad interpretations of state statutes involving presidential 
elections could violate Article II, a point embraced by three concurring Justices 
in Bush v. Gore. The concurring Justices relied upon their own narrow views of 
proper interpretation to see a constitutional problem. Contrary to the position of 
the Bush v. Gore concurring Justices, this Article contends that use of the 
Democracy Canon to construe state statutes dealing with presidential or 
congressional elections does not violate Article II or Article I, section 4. 
Instead, the long-standing nature of the Democracy Canon and the values it 
supports give state courts ample authority to construe state election statutes 
covering federal elections in light of the Canon. Only when a state court relies 
upon the Canon in a way that counters longstanding practice should a federal 
court consider intervening in a state court election case on constitutional (likely 
due process) grounds. For the most part, concerns about overreaching should 
be addressed ex ante by the legislature: a state legislature concerned about state 
court application of the Democracy Canon in the context of federal elections 
can use clear statements to negate its application, as the Samson court 
illustrated in its opinion. 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRACY CANON, ITS VARIATIONS, AND 
ITS LIKELY ROLE IN FUTURE ELECTION LAW DISPUTES 
A.  A Brief History of the Democracy Canon 
The Democracy Canon is the Rodney Dangerfield of canons.18  Because of 
its use primarily in state courts rather than federal courts (and given the federal-
centric nature of legislation courses), it is not on the Eskridge, Frickey, and 
Garrett list of the over two hundred canons employed by the Roberts and 
Rehnquist Courts.19  It did not make Llewellyn’s list of canons and counter-
canons,20  nor did it make Eskridge’s and Sunstein’s aspirational lists of 
normative canons promoting public values.21  Nor is the Canon discussed in 
18. That is, it “don’t get no respect.” RODNEY DANGERFIELD, I DON’T GET NO RESPECT 
(BMG Special Products 2001) (1980). 
19. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B at 39 
(4th ed. 2007). The only election-law-related canon on the list is that the “Voting Rights Act 
should be interpreted in light of its core purpose of preventing race discrimination in voting 
and fostering a transformation of America into a society no longer fixated on race.” Id. 
(citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 339, 434 (2006); Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 490 (2003)). 
20. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About how Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). 
Llewellyn actually does cite one of the germinal American cases recognizing the Democracy 
Canon, Bowers v. Smith, 20 S.W. 101 (Mo. 1892), but for a different canon of construction. 
Llewellyn, supra, at 402 & n.10 (citing Bowers for the “parry” that reliance on a foreign 
court’s construction of a foreign statute “may be rejected where there is conflict with the 
obvious meaning of the statute or where the foreign decisions are unsatisfactory in reasoning 
or where the foreign interpretation is not in harmony with the spirit or policy of the laws of 
the adopting state”). Bowers rejected out-of-state authority construing laws similar to 
Missouri’s regulating the “Australian” (or secret) ballot. 20 S.W. at 104. Michael Sinclair, 
reviewing Llewellyn’s reliance on Bowers, notes Bowers “began with a statement of general 
policy in election cases, a very principled democratic policy, worthy perhaps of being called 
a canon.” Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” 
One to Seven, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 964 (2005). Sinclair does not delve further into 
the Democracy Canon. The Democracy Canon also makes a cameo appearance in Adam M. 
Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 966 (2006) (discussing the Canon and noting that in dealing with 
election statutes “state courts sometimes explicitly recognize that the legislature is operating 
within the area of constitutional values and, at least partly for that reason, become assertive 
in adjudicating election law cases”). 
21. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1007, 1095-1104 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory 
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 506-08 (1989). Eskridge discerns a pattern of interpretation in 
the Supreme Court, at least in an earlier era, applying the canon that “[s]tatutes affecting 
certain discrete and insular minorities—‘Carolene groups’—shall be interpreted, where 
possible, for the benefit of those minorities.” Eskridge, supra, at 1032. Similarly, Sunstein 
advocates for “[a]ggressive construction of ambiguous statutes designed to protect 
disadvantaged groups [to provide] a way for courts to protect the constitutional norm of 
equal protection in a less intrusive manner” than through constitutional adjudication. 
Sunstein, supra, at 473. But see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 948-50 (noting either “no 
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any detail in the Election Law casebooks.22 
Nonetheless, the Canon has had long and consistent acceptance in state 
courts heretofore unnoticed by legislation scholars. The rule announced in 1885 
by the Supreme Court of Texas in Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, that “[a]ll 
statutes tending to limit the citizen in his exercise of [the right of suffrage] 
should be liberally construed in his favor,”23  is often cited and has been 
followed by courts throughout the United States.24  Interpretations of statutes in 
favor of a broad right to vote continued to be prevalent throughout the 
twentieth century,25  and many of the same themes have carried through into 
modern cases,26  with cases as recent as the 2008 election season relying on the 
explicit support” or “implicit rejection” of a “Disadvantaged Groups” canon by the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts). There is some overlap between the proposed Carolene 
Groups Canon and the Democracy Canon, as discussed below in Part II. Carolene refers to 
the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938). See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). 
22. The latest edition of the Lowenstein, Hasen, and Tokaji casebook has a discussion 
of the Samson case in the context of “strict enforcement versus substantial compliance” of 
ballot measure requirements. DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 398-99 (4th ed. 2008). The discussion does not cover the Canon explicitly. See 
also id. at 283 (mentioning the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board controversy). The 
latest edition of the Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes casebook briefly discusses the Samson 
case in the context of qualifications clause issues. It notes that despite the statutory language 
of the New Jersey statute, “[t]he New Jersey Supreme Court nonetheless held that because 
election laws should be construed ‘to allow the greatest scope for public participation in the 
electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties to put their 
candidates on the ballot, and most importantly, to allow the voters a choice on Election 
Day,’ the Democratic Party should be permitted to nominate a substitute and the state should 
be required to place the substitute’s name, on the general election ballot.” SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 948 (3d ed. 2007) (quoting N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 
1036 (N.J. 2002)). Both casebooks contrast Samson with a recent questionable case in which 
the Fifth Circuit held that Texas law, read in light of the Constitution’s qualifications clause, 
barred Republicans from replacing Congressman Tom DeLay on the ballot in 2006, Texas 
Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006). See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra, 
at 947-48; LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 399-400. 
23. Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 1885 WL 7221, at *7 (1885).  
24. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Henry, 39 So. 507, 508 (Ala. 1905); State ex rel. 
Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 51 (Fla. 1940); State ex rel. Law v. Saxon, 12 So. 218, 
224 (Fla. 1892); Barr v. Cardell, 155 N.W. 312, 314 (Iowa 1915); Queenan v. Mimms, 283 
S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ky. 1955); Silberstein v. Prince, 149 N.W. 653, 654 (Minn. 1914); Carson 
v. Kalisch, 99 A. 199, 202 (N.J. 1916). These principles are sometimes stated in terms of 
accepting “substantial compliance” with election laws rather than strict compliance, or that 
election laws are “directory” (or advisory) only rather than mandatory. 
25. Mitchell v. Kinney, 5 So. 2d 788, 792 (Ala. 1942); Simpson v. Osborn, 34 P. 747, 
749 (Kan. 1893); White v. Sanderson, 76 N.W. 1021, 1022 (Minn. 1898); Bowers v. Smith, 
20 S.W. 101, 103 (Mo. 1892); Stackpole v. Hallahan, 40 P. 80, 84 (Mont. 1895). 
26. Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(applying Missouri law and relying on Nance v. Kearbey, 158 S.W. 629 (Mo. 1913)); Carr v. 
Thomas, 586 P.2d 622, 626 n.11 (Alaska 1978); In re Nomination of Flaherty, 770 A.2d 
327, 331 (Pa. 2001). 
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Canon.27   
The Canon’s stated purposes usually are described in terms of its role in 
fostering democracy. Its purpose is “to give effect to the will of the majority 
and to prevent the disfranchisement of legal voters . . . .”28  The canon plays a 
role in “favoring free and competitive elections . . . .”29  It recognizes that the 
right to vote “is a part of the very warp and woof of the American ideal and it is 
a right protected by both the constitutions of the United States and of the 
state.”30  Liberal construction of election laws serves “to allow the greatest 
scope for public participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get 
on the ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot, and most 
importantly to allow voters a choice on Election Day.”31   
Here is a brief sampling of cases relying on the Canon from the nineteenth 
century to the present.32 
In the 1892 case of State ex rel. Law v. Saxon, the Supreme Court of 
Florida, following Owens, refused to disqualify ballots that contained writings 
on them such as “Free Suffrage Ticket,” despite a state law barring the 
counting of ballots with “ornaments, designation, mutilation, symbol, or mark 
of any kind whatsoever, except the name or names of the person or persons 
voted for, and the office to which such person or persons are intended to be 
chosen . . . .”33  The court declared: 
It is . . . not to be lost sight of that a ballot will never be vitiated by anything 
which is not clearly within the prohibiting words and meaning of the statute. 
The elector should not be deprived of his vote through mere inference, but 
only upon the clear expression of the law.34 
 The court refused to rely upon cases from other jurisdictions reading similar 
statutes strictly, finding that “in [our state] there is much more room for 
construction.”35 
In 1914, the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered a challenge to some 
votes cast on ballots for the mayor of Duluth. On the same ballot, voters were 
asked to vote for city commissioners. For the commission race, the ballot 
employed an “anti-single shot” provision,36  requiring voters to vote for a first 
27. See infra notes 45-48. 
28. Montgomery, 39 So. 507, 508 (Ala. 1905). 
29. State ex rel. White v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections, 598 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 
(Ohio 1992). 
30. State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899, 905-06 (Ohio 1948). 
31. Catania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d 374, 379 (N.J. 1991). 
32. A separate controversial canon holds that legislation adopted by direct democracy 
deserves special deference. This topic, beyond the scope of this paper, receives careful 
treatment in Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, 
Direct Democracy, 1 J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 105, 122 (1997). 
33. 12 So. 218, 218 (Fla. 1892).  
34. Id. at 224. 
35. Id. at 226. 
36. On the use of such provisions in the context of racial discrimination in the South, 
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choice for as many candidates for commissioners as there were commissioners 
to be elected. The relevant election law declared that all ballots “shall be void” 
if they did not contain the requisite number of commissioner votes. The state 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that ballots not containing the requisite 
number of commissioner votes could not count for mayor either: 
[I]t is a rule of universal application that all statutes tending to limit the citizen 
in the exercise of his right of suffrage must be construed liberally in his favor. 
Hence a literal and isolated reading of the vitiating words, upon which alone, 
if at all, contestant’s position is tenable, cannot be adopted unless there is no 
other recourse . . . .37 
Thus, in this case, the Canon trumped the plain language of the statute 
declaring that those counted ballots “shall be void” and the votes for mayor 
were counted. 
In a 1955 Kentucky case, Queenan v. Mimms, a minor political party, in 
the reasonable but mistaken belief that there were twelve open offices on a city 
council, submitted the names of twelve candidates to run for the offices. In fact, 
there were only six open offices. The minor party tried to withdraw the names 
of six of the twelve candidates, and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held it 
could do so, despite a law stating that petitions naming more than one 
candidate for each open office were void. The court concluded that “the 
remaining six should be recognized” as candidates because of the “fundamental 
principle that the courts will construe election statutes liberally in favor of the 
citizens whose right to choose their public officers is challenged.”38 
In a 1978 case, the Supreme Court of Alaska held it was proper to count 
ballots cast by challenged voters who voted using punch card ballots, despite 
the fact that the relevant Alaska statute required challenged voters to vote using 
a “paper ballot.”39  The court relied upon a particularly strong form of the 
Democracy Canon in reaching this result: “Courts are reluctant to permit a 
wholesale disfranchisement of qualified electors through no fault of their own, 
and ‘[w]here any reasonable construction of the statute can be found which will 
avoid such a result, the courts should and will favor it.’”40  It announced a 
super-strong clear statement rule applicable “[i]n the absence of fraud”:41 
The right of the citizen to cast his ballot and thus participate in the selection of 
those who control his government is one of the fundamental prerogatives of 
see Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and 
Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 23-24 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). 
37. Silberstein v. Prince, 149 N.W. 653, 654 (Minn. 1914) (citation omitted).  
38. Queenan v. Mimms, 283 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ky. 1955). 
39. Carr v. Thomas, 586 P.2d 622, 624 (Alaska 1978). Though punch card ballots “are 
constructed of paper, so that literally they are ‘paper ballots,’” id., the argument was not 
frivolous: the Alaska Voter Handbook distinguished between paper ballots and punch card 
ballots. Id. at 625 n.8.  
40. Id. at 626 (quoting Reese v. Dempsey, 153 P.2d 127, 132 (N.M. 1944)).  
41. Id. at 626 n.11. 
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citizenship and should not be impaired or destroyed by strained statutory 
constructions. If in the interests of the purity of the ballot the vote of one not 
morally at fault is to be declared invalid, the Legislature must say so in clear 
and unmistakable terms.42 
The Democracy Canon has retained its vitality into the new century. In 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris,43  discussed more fully in 
Part IV below, the Florida Supreme Court relied upon the Canon to extend the 
time for Al Gore to get the results of manual recounts of ballots during the 
disputed 2000 presidential election. In New Jersey Democratic Party v. 
Samson,44  discussed more fully in Part III below, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court relied upon the Canon to allow Democrats to name a replacement for 
withdrawn Senator Robert Torricelli facing reelection. 
Finally, in the two 2008 Ohio cases described in the Introduction, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio relied upon the Democracy Canon to side with voters. 
In State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner,45  the court relied upon the Democracy 
Canon and other tools of interpretation, including deference to the Secretary of 
State’s interpretation of the relevant statute, to conclude that a voter need only 
be registered for thirty days before an election to be a qualified elector, and 
need not be registered for thirty days before applying for, receiving, or 
completing an absentee ballot.46  In State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner,47  the state 
high court rejected the Secretary of State’s interpretation of absentee ballot 
application statutes as “unreasonable,” and concluded that voters need not 
check an unnecessary box before their absentee ballot applications could be 
accepted by elections officials. The court held its decision was “consistent with 
‘our duty to liberally construe election laws in favor of the right to vote.’”48 
Though the Democracy Canon is usually the result of judicial declaration, 
it sometimes appears explicitly as a legislatively drafted rule of interpretation. 
For example, a provision of the Kansas statutes governing rules for regulating 
elections and voting provides that “[t]he provisions of this act shall be 
construed liberally for the purpose of effectuating its purposes.”49  Some state 
42. Id. at 626-27. 
43. 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000). 
44. 814 A.2d 1028, 1036 (N.J. 2002). 
45. 896 N.E.2d 979 (Ohio 2008). 
46. Id. at 992 (“[T]he secretary of state’s construction is consistent with our duty to 
liberally construe election laws in favor of the right to vote.”).  
47.  899 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 2008). 
48. Id. at 124 (quoting Colvin, 896 N.E.2d at 992). 
49. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-439 (2008); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(1) (2008) 
(“This code shall be liberally construed so that all eligible electors may be permitted to vote 
and those who are not eligible electors may be kept from voting in order to prevent fraud and 
corruption in elections.”); IOWA CODE § 48A.1 (1999) (“It is the intent of the general 
assembly to facilitate the registration of eligible residents of this state through the 
widespread availability of voter registration services. This chapter and other statutes relating 
to voter registration are to be liberally construed toward this end.”); id. § 48A.5A(7) 
(“Residence requirements shall be construed liberally to provide homeless persons with the 
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statutes provide more specifically for liberal construction of laws affecting 
absentee voters,50  military voters,51  or voters using provisional ballots.52   
Though the state courts have relied heavily on the Democracy Canon for 
well over a century, it has been cited much more rarely in federal courts. 
Federal courts have relied upon the Canon when they have been called upon to 
construe state election laws, and the relevant state courts have adopted a policy 
of liberal construction of their laws. For example, in the 2007 case, Missouri 
Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc. v. Carnahan,53  the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered a constitutional challenge to a 
Missouri law that disqualifies persons under court-ordered guardianship from 
voting. Before reaching the constitutional question whether the law violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court first had to 
consider the reach of the Missouri statute. The court concluded that the 
opportunity to register to vote and to vote.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-102 (2008) (“The 
Election Act shall apply to all elections held in the state unless otherwise specifically 
provided. The act shall be liberally construed so that the will of the registered voters is not 
defeated by an informality or a failure to comply with the act with respect to the giving of 
any notice or the conducting of any election or the certifying of the results of the election.”); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-6-64 (2009) (“The laws of this state pertaining to primary 
elections shall be liberally construed so that the real will of the voters may not be defeated 
by a mere technicality.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-401(1) (1953) (“This part shall be 
construed liberally so as to ensure full opportunity for persons to become candidates and for 
voters to express their choice.”) (applying to primary elections); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 
1821 (2009) (“The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed so that the real will 
of the voters shall not be defeated and so that the voters shall not be deprived of their right 
because of informality or failure to comply with provisions of law as to notice or conduct of 
the election or of certifying the results thereof.”); WIS. STAT. § 5.01(1) (2008) (“Except as 
otherwise provided, chs. 5 to 12 shall be construed to give effect to the will of the electors, if 
that can be ascertained from the proceedings, notwithstanding informality or failure to fully 
comply with some of their provisions.”). 
50. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3000 (West 2007) (requiring that code provisions on 
vote by mail voting “shall be liberally construed in favor of the vote by mail voter”); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 103Q (West 2009) (“No mere informality in the manner or 
carrying out any provision of law affecting voting by absent voting ballot at an election shall 
invalidate such election or constitute sufficient cause for the rejection of the returns thereof, 
and such provisions shall be construed liberally to effectuate their purposes.”); cf. R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 17-20-34 (1956) (“This chapter shall be construed liberally to effect the purposes of 
maintaining the integrity and the secrecy of the mail ballot by assuring that only electors 
eligible to vote by mail ballot are allowed to utilize that method of voting, by assuring that 
the procedures set forth in this chapter controlling the application and balloting processes are 
strictly enforced, and by safeguarding the mail ballot voter from harassment, intimidation, 
and invasion of privacy.”).  
51. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 53.51 (1999) (“This division shall be liberally construed in 
order to provide means and opportunity for qualified voters of the state of Iowa serving in 
the armed forces of the United States to vote.”); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 10-126 (McKinney 2009) 
(“The provisions of this article shall be liberally construed for the purpose of providing 
military voters the opportunity to vote.”). 
52. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14312 (West 2009) (“This article shall be liberally 
construed in favor of the provisional voter.”). 
53. 499 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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Missouri law did not disqualify from voting any adult besides those who had 
been “adjudged incapacitated.” Reading the statute to restrict the voting rights 
of more individuals “would conflict with well-established principles [including 
the principle] that Missouri’s election laws ‘must be liberally construed in aid 
of the right of suffrage[.]’”54  Other federal cases have employed the Canon 
similarly in construing state election laws.55   
But the Canon does not appear to have independent force in federal courts 
construing federal election statutes. Indeed, aside from the canon that the 
“Voting Rights Act should be interpreted in light of its core purpose of 
preventing race discrimination in voting and fostering a transformation of 
America into a society no longer fixated on race,”56  I have not discovered any 
federal cases considering whether federal laws governing the casting and 
counting of ballots—such as the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”),57  the 
National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”),58  or the Uniformed and Overseas 
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”)59—should be liberally construed 
in favor of the rights of voters. The omission is interesting because both the 
NVRA and UOCAVA include aspirational language recognizing the 
fundamental right to vote and have that vote counted. The NVRA includes the 
following findings: 
The Congress finds that— 
(1) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right; 
(2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the 
exercise of that right; and 
54. Id. at 806 (quoting Nance v. Kearbey, 158 S.W. 629, 631 (Mo. 1913)). The court 
held that the provision, as narrowly construed, did not violate the equal protection rights of 
the plaintiffs. Id. at 808-09. 
55. See, e.g., Koehler v. Davidson, No. 04-CV-01377, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74328, 
at *4-5 (D. Colo. Oct. 12, 2006) (noting earlier unpublished federal district court case 
construing Colorado statute in light of Colorado liberal construction rule codified in COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(1) (2008)); cf. Afran v. McGreevey, 115 Fed. App’x 539, 545-46 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (refusing to apply New Jersey liberal construction canon to interpretation of state 
constitution in context of request to hold special gubernatorial election).  
56. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19; see also Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 204 
(E.D. Ark. 1989) (three-judge court) (Arnold, J.) (finding that section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act “should be construed liberally in favor of its object, which is to open up the electoral 
process to full participation”). A portion of the Voting Rights Act has very broad language 
that might be used to expand the Democracy Canon in federal courts. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1971(a)(2)(B) (2006) (“No person acting under color of state law shall . . . deny the right of 
any individual to vote in any election because of an error or omission on any record or paper 
relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or 
omission is not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under State law 
to vote in such election.”); Schwier v. Cox, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (finding a 
Georgia requirement that voting registrants disclose Social Security number before voting 
violated materiality provision of Voting Rights Act), aff’d, 439 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2006). 
57. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10.  
59. Id. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6. 
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(3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a 
direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal 
office and disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, 
including racial minorities. 60 
Similarly, a 2001 amendment to UOCAVA includes the following “Sense 
of Congress:” 
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that each person who is an 
administrator of a Federal, State, or local election— 
(1) should be aware of the importance of the ability of each uniformed 
services voter to exercise the right to vote; and 
(2) should perform that person’s duties as an election administrator with the 
intent to ensure that— 
(A) each uniformed services voter receives the utmost consideration and 
cooperation when voting; 
(B) each valid ballot cast by such a voter is duly counted; and 
(C) all eligible American voters, regardless of race, ethnicity, disability, the 
language they speak, or the resources of the community in which they live, 
should have an equal opportunity to cast a vote and to have that vote 
counted. 61 
The Canon likely has not yet gained independent vitality in federal courts 
for two reasons. First, since the founding of the Republic, there has been much 
more state law rather than federal law governing the nuts and bolts of voting 
and registration thanks to the decentralized nature of elections in this 
country.62  Thus, federal courts until recently simply have not had the same 
opportunities to construe election administration statutes as states courts; there 
has not been much federal statutory election administration law to construe. 
Federal courts have certainly been active in election law cases, especially since 
the 1960s. But these have been primarily constitutional cases, not statutory 
cases involving the interpretation of federal statutes governing the nuts and 
bolts of election administration. 
Second, the Canon has not spread to federal courts because Legislation 
courses and treatises tend to focus on canons in federal courts. As the 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg. The statute also lists the following purposes: 
(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who 
register to vote in elections for Federal office; 
(2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this 
subchapter in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters 
in elections for Federal office; 
(3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and 
(4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b). 
 60. Pub. L. No. 107-107, div. A, tit. XVI, § 1601, 115 Stat. 1274 (2001). Interestingly, 
there are no such findings in HAVA, which was passed as part of a political compromise and 
has been deeply contentious in the courts ever since. On HAVA generally, see Leonard M. 
Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424 (2004). 
62. ALEC EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN 
SUFFRAGE 3 (2009). 
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Democracy Canon’s widespread and longstanding use in state courts becomes 
more widely known in the legislation and election law fields, federal courts are 
more likely to adopt it.  
B. The Scope of the Democracy Canon and Variations on Its Use 
Though the Canon’s use in state courts is longstanding and broad, there is 
some variation in (1) the scope and reach of the Canon; (2) the strength of the 
Canon; (3) and when it is triggered. I briefly describe each of these in turn. 
1. The scope and reach of the Canon  
Though there is no question that courts since 1885 have applied a canon of 
liberally construing some election laws, it is more difficult to define concisely 
the scope and reach of the Canon. The Canon often is phrased in terms of 
statutes concerning the “right of suffrage” or the “right to vote,” but it has not 
been applied across all election law cases, such as to campaign finance cases or 
vote dilution cases. Instead, the cases applying the Canon fall mostly into three 
categories, with the large plurality of cases (especially the earliest cases) falling 
into the first category: 
a. Vote counting cases  
In these cases, such as Owens,63  someone relies upon the Canon to argue, 
following an election, for the counting of ballots that have not been counted 
because of minor voter error, election official error, or a disputed reading of a 
relevant statute or set of statutes.  
b. Voter eligibility/registration cases  
In these cases, such as Myles, 64  someone relies upon the Canon to argue, 
before an election, that a voter or certain group of voters who have been told 
they cannot vote should be allowed to cast a ballot that will be counted even 
though election officials have determined they cannot register or vote because 
of minor voter error, election official error, or a disputed reading of a relevant 
statute or set of statutes.  
63. Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 1885 WL 7221, at *7 (Tex. Oct. 20, 
1885). 
64. State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner, 899 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Ohio 2008). In Myles, the 
question was less urgent. Under the Republican argument, these voters could still vote, but 
they would have to vote thirty days after they registered to vote.  
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c. Candidate/party competitiveness cases  
In these cases, such as Queenan,65  a candidate or political party relies 
upon the Canon (and particularly on the voters’ right to vote in a competitive 
election) to argue, before an election, that a certain candidate should be allowed 
to run in an election or appear on an election ballot, even though election 
officials have excluded the candidate or party from the ballot because of minor 
candidate or party error, election official error, or a disputed reading of a 
relevant statute or set of statutes.66   
Taken together, these applications show the Canon historically has been 
relied upon for two principal purposes: (1) to expand opportunities for 
registered voters to vote and have their votes counted (voter access and 
enfranchisement); and, to a lesser extent, (2) to promote competitive elections 
by including more candidates or parties on the ballot (electoral 
competitiveness). 
I located no cases in which courts have relied upon (or considered relying 
upon) the Democracy Canon to limit those who could register to vote or vote, 
or to limit candidates or parties on the ballot in the name of fraud prevention, 
prevention of vote dilution, promotion of orderly elections, or some other 
ostensible state purposes.67  Though the “access vs. integrity” debate certainly 
plays out in current election law cases,68  historically the Canon was not 
deployed (and still has not been deployed) in any way to limit the counting of 
votes.  
The Canon’s reach is subject to two important limitations. First, courts will 
not apply the Canon when there are serious allegations of fraud. Indeed, courts 
often go out of their way to make the point that the case it is considering does 
not involve fraud. For example, a 1910 New York election contest case, Fallon 
v. Dwyer,69  concerned the counting of some disputed ballots that would affect 
the outcome of a local election. The statute required voters to mark choices for 
office with two “crossed” and “straight” lines. The court held that disputed 
65. Queenan v. Mimms, 283 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ky. 1955) (citing Greene v. Slusher, 
190 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Ky. 1945)); see also People ex rel. Dickerson v. Williamson, 56 N.E. 
1127, 1129 (Ill. 1900) (relying on the Canon to read state ballot access statute in a way to 
make it easier for candidates of qualified political parties to remain on the ballot).  
66. For a recent example, see Anchorage v. Mjos, 179 P.3d 941, 943 n.1 (Alaska 2008) 
(relying on the Canon in concluding that term limits statutes should be interpreted to allow 
those serving partial terms to run for an additional term of office). 
67. The closest case I could find is a 1932 Arkansas case in which a losing candidate 
sought to challenge an election on grounds that some voters were ineligible because they 
failed to pay a poll tax. The state supreme court relied upon the “rule of liberal construction 
applied to primary election laws in this state” to hold that the candidate’s time to file his 
contest had not expired. Nelson v. Parrish, 53 S.W.2d 985, 986 (Ark. 1932). The case did not 
hold that the Canon required the exclusion of votes of those voters who did not pay a poll 
tax. 
68. See the discussion in Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 2. 
69. 90 N.E. 942 (N.Y. 1910). 
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ballots must be counted when they have been marked by voters who did not 
draw lines perfectly straight. The court declared that votes should be counted 
when ballots were marked with  
a tremulous line drawn by an infirm elector, or an irregular or curved line 
drawn by an elector with poor eyesight or with muscles untrained to the use of 
a pencil, or any single line but once crossing another single line in such a way 
as to substantially comply with the statute (even if it is somewhat hooked at 
the end, or the line has been retraced, and the pencil has not been kept exactly 
on the line at parts removed from the point where the lines cross) . . . .70   
The court emphasized that “[c]ounsel for the parties in open court stated that 
there is no claim on this appeal that the disputed ballots were marked by the 
voters with fraudulent intent.”71 
Second, in those cases involving voter error or candidate/party error, courts 
tend to limit the reach of the statute to cases involving minor errors (what the 
courts often term “substantial compliance” with the relevant statute).72  For 
example, a court in a state with a voter registration requirement is not going to 
count the vote of an eligible voter who had an opportunity to register to vote 
but who declined to do so.73  No court will consider failure to attempt to 
register to vote to be a “minor” defect allowing the non-registered voter to cast 
a vote that would be counted. 
This second limitation necessarily involves the exercise of judicial 
judgment. An error that appears minor to one judge can appear more serious to 
another judge. One tool courts sometimes employ to decide whether a defect is 
minor enough to constitute “substantial compliance” is to examine the 
relationship between the voter error and the purpose of the statutory 
requirement. For example, in Saxon, the Florida Supreme Court held that 
election officials should accept for counting ballots marked by voters with the 
names of political parties, despite a statutory prohibition on counting ballots 
containing any “mark” or other such information. The court stated that the 
purpose of the statute was “to protect the voter against having the nature of his 
vote detected, before his ballot went into the box, through its color, or some 
distinguishing mark thereon, by other persons, who might be seeking to control 
him through intimidation or otherwise . . . .”74  It held that ballots containing 
70. Id. at 943. 
71. Id.; see also Wilbourn v. Hobson, 608 So. 2d 1187, 1193 (Miss. 1992) (“If the 
integrity of a ballot is unquestioned, there is no good reason to disenfranchise a voter for 
some technical aberration beyond his control. . . . Of course, if there had been even a hint of 
unseemliness associated with the ballots at issue, then even a technical irregularity might 
have rendered them void.”). 
72. The requirement that the error be minor does not apply to errors of election 
officials. Indeed, the greater the errors of election officials, the more likely courts seem to be 
willing to construe a statute in favor of enfranchisement. 
73. Cf. Buckner v. Lynip, 41 P. 762, 765 (Nev. 1895) (“For instance, a law for the 
registration of voters, to be effectual, must provide that one not registered shall not vote . . . 
.”). 
74. State ex rel. Law v. Saxon, 12 So. 218, 224-25 (Fla. 1892). 
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ents “is a policy determination for the legislature, not 
this court, to make.”79 
                                   
information on the ballot that would not “distinguish the ticket from others cast 
at the election” should be counted as substantially complying with the 
te.75 
In recent years, courts have expanded the reach of the Canon. In earlier 
years, some courts held that the Democracy Canon does not apply to laws 
regulating absentee ballots, on grounds that absentee voting is a privilege rather 
than a right,76  or that strict compliance with absentee ballot laws are necessary 
to prevent fraud.77  The modern majority trend holds that the Canon applies to 
cases involving absentee ballot laws.78  A recent counterexample is Minnesota, 
where the state supreme court recently rejected a “substantial compliance” 
standard for absentee ballots in the Coleman-Franken U.S. Senate election 
contest, stating that the proper treatment of ballots deviating from statutory 
absentee ballot requirem
                       
s for such voting.” (citing Wichelmann v. Glencoe, 273 N.W. 638, 640 (Minn. 
1937))).  
results satisfactory to themselves. There are no presumptions or 
infer
otecting and furthering the right of 
suffr
s for unintended and insubstantial irregularities without any demonstrable 
d necessitating setting aside elections more frequently for the slightest good-
faith
e Purpose of Electing a 
75. Id. at 225. 
76. Bell v. Gannaway, 227 N.W.2d 797, 802 (Minn. 1975) (“Since the privilege of 
absentee voting is granted by the legislature, the legislature may mandate the conditions and 
procedure
77. See, e.g., In re Baker, 213 N.Y.S. 524, 528 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (“This absentee vote 
statute is in derogation of the general Election Law and should be strictly construed. Its 
provisions should be rigidly adhered to; otherwise the repeater, floater, and nonresident are 
given a free hand to gain 
ences in its favor.”).  
78. Adkins v. Huckabay, 755 So. 2d 206, 216 (La. 2000) (“The majority of states . . . 
have concluded that absentee voting laws should be liberally construed in aid of the right to 
vote.”); M.C. Dransfeld, Construction and Effect of Absentee Voters’ Laws, 97 A.L.R.2d 257 
§ 5b (1964 and 2009 Supp.) (“In most jurisdictions absentee voting laws have been liberally 
construed so as to further their evident purpose of pr
age.”). As the Colorado Supreme Court explained: 
We believe the time has come to interpret absentee voting legislation in light of the realities 
of modern life and the fundamental character of the right of suffrage. We live in a society 
which, to a great extent, depends upon mobility as an indispensable condition of progress. 
Many persons for legitimate reasons cannot be physically present at a polling place to cast 
their ballots on the day of election. These electors, no less than in-person voters, should be 
able to present their views on issues of public importance without being encumbered by an 
unyielding standard of statutory exactitude. Moreover, the right to vote is a fundamental right 
of the first order. Absentee voting legislation should not be construed in a manner that 
unduly interferes with the exercise of this right by those otherwise qualified to vote. Nor 
should the exercise of the voting right be conditioned upon compliance with a degree of 
precision that in many cases may be a source of more confusion than enlightenment to 
interested voters. A rule of strict compliance, especially in the absence of any showing of 
fraud, undue influence, or intentional wrongdoing, results in the needless disenfranchisement 
of absent voter
social benefit. 
Erickson v. Blair, 670 P.2d 749, 754-55 (Colo. 1983) (citations omitted); see also Adkins, 
755 So. 2d at 218 (“The weaknesses in strict compliance, however, are too unforgiving, 
attendant with harsh consequences. More often than not, electors would be unreasonably 
disenfranchise
 error.”). 
79. In re Contest of Gen. Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008, for th
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2. Canon strength  
For some courts, such as the Ohio Supreme Court in its recent election law 
opinions,80  the Democracy Canon functions as a “rule of thumb,”81  part of a 
“checklist” for a court to consider in construing an election law.82  For other 
courts, the Canon constitutes a clear-statement rule, requiring the legislature to 
speak clearly before a court will construe a statute contrary to the Canon. Some 
courts even view the Canon as a “super-strong clear statement rule”:83  the 
Alaska Supreme Court appears to have gone the furthest, holding that the 
Democracy Canon applies to laws governing the right to vote unless the 
legislature indicates to the contrary in “clear and unmistakable terms.”84 
Many courts recognize that the Canon sometimes conflicts with other 
canons or interpretive principles. For example, the Canon may conflict with a 
rule of deference to the reasonable interpretation of the official charged with 
interpreting election laws.85  Courts in construing election law statutes also 
must consider “important state interests, including orderly electoral 
processes”86  and fraud prevention.87  Perhaps most importantly in the case of 
federal elections, the Canon may conflict with federalism principles, an issue 
considered in Part IV below. In short, courts vary on how much weight to give 
to the Canon compared to other interpretive tools and policies. 
3. Is the Canon triggered only by ambiguous statutes? 
Some courts hold that the Canon does not come into play when the words 
of a statute are unambiguous,88  but other courts do not appear to follow this 
U.S. nn. 2009). 
 “simply rules of thumb” (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 
253 
t that they are just a checklist of things to think about when 
approach
. 452 (1991), discussed in Part III below, as using a “super-
stron
declared
, 999 (Ohio 1995). 
 374, 379 (N.J. 1991). 
construction rule does not apply when 
 Senator from Minn., 767 N.W.2d 453, 462 n.11 (Mi
80. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
81. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (describing canons of 
construction as
(1992))). 
82. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 947 (“Perhaps the least ambitious defense 
of the canons is to posi
ing a statute.”).  
83. Cf. id. at 934-35. Eskridge et al. describe the Supreme Court’s federalism canon in 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S
g clear statement rule.”  
84. Carr v. Thomas, 586 P.2d 622, 627 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Sanchez v. Bravo, 251 
S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)); see also Montgomery v. Henry, 39 So. 507, 508 
(Ala. 1905) (“The courts, in order to give effect to the will of the majority and to prevent the 
disfranchisement of legal voters have uniformly held those provisions to be formal and 
directory merely which are not essential to a fair election, unless such provisions are 
 to be essential by the statute itself.” (emphasis added)). 
85. State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 651 N.E.2d 995
86. Catania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d
87. Carr, 586 P.2d at 626 n.11. 
88.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Brady v. Blackwell, 857 N.E.2d 1181, 1189 (Ohio 2006) 
(O’Donnell, J., concurring) (stating that the liberal 
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rule. 
For example, in Bowers v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1892 
held that election officials had to count votes cast for the sheriff of the city of 
Pettis even though the ballots, through a fault of the county clerk, incorrectly 
included some ineligible candidates’ names.89  Despite the fact that the relevant 
election law stated that ballots not complying with the rules “shall not be . . . 
counted,”90  the Bowers majority, relying on the Democracy Canon, held they 
should be counted: “[The contrary] construction of a law as would permit the 
disfranchisement of large bodies of voters, because of an error of a single 
official, should never be adopted where the language in question is fairly 
susceptible of any other.”91 
Only eight years later, however, the Supreme Court of Missouri in McKay 
v. Minner expressly overruled Bowers on grounds that the Bowers court erred 
in reaching an interpretation that went against the plain meaning (what the 
court termed “the very teeth”) of the relevant statute.92  The court did not 
discuss the Democracy Canon per se, but the McKay ruling implied that the 
Canon had no force in the face of an unambiguous statute. 
By 1913, however, in Nance v. Kearbey93  (the case providing the opening 
quotation for this Article), the Supreme Court of Missouri reaffirmed the 
Democracy Canon’s vitality and resuscitated Bowers, noting that the case “has 
been cited with approval and followed by more courts of last resort than any 
other election case ever decided by this court, and the credit reflected on the 
distinguished jurist who then spoke for the court is shared by the court 
itself.”94  The upshot of these Missouri cases appears to be that the Democracy 
Canon is alive and well in Missouri, but it remains unclear whether the Canon 
may apply to construe an unambiguous statute. 
statutory provisions are “patent and unambiguous”). 
89. 20 S.W. 101, 104 (Mo. 1892). 
90. Id. at 109-10 (Gantt, J., dissenting) (quoting section 4772 of state elections code). 
91. Id. at 103. 
92. McKay v. Minner, 55 S.W. 866, 868 (Mo. 1900). 
93. 158 S.W. 629, 631 (Mo. 1913). 
94. Id. at 633. 
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Figure 1: Election Challenge Cases by Year, 1996-2008 
 
C. The Potential Importance of the Canon Given the Post-2000 Rise in 
Election Law Litigation 
Before turning to a normative defense of the Canon, and a discussion of 
political and federalism issues surrounding its use, it is worth putting the debate 
over the Canon’s application in perspective. Election law problems that existed 
in 1885 continue to exist today: clerks err in producing the format of the ballot; 
voters make mistakes in how ballots are cast; and legislatures continue to write 
election laws leaving holes and ambiguities that raise questions in litigation 
over whose votes should count, who is entitled to vote, and which candidates 
may be on the ballot. The difference between the past and now is that the stakes 
are much bigger, as election law has become more of a political strategy for 
candidates and parties seeking political advantage,95  and as the rise of the 
Internet and especially the blogosphere has put every controversial judicial 
decision under a public microscope. 
95. See generally Hasen, Beyond the Margin, supra note 2. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Election Challenge Cases in State Courts, 1996-2008 
Following up on some of my earlier work, I have updated the statistics 
regarding the amount of election litigation in the courts.96  In the pre-2000 
period, state and federal courts handled an average of about 94 election cases 
per year. In the 2000-2008 period, that number has more than doubled to an 
average of 237 election cases per year.97  See Figure 1. 
96. As with my last counts, this count is based upon a Lexis search of state and federal 
court databases using a year restriction and “election w/p challenge,” then culling out cases 
that are obviously inapplicable. See id. at 958; Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 2, at 28 
n.140. The cases cited and described are in an Excel spreadsheet posted at 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/Election%20Litigation%20Cases.xls. 
97. If it is any consolation for those hoping for a decline in the amount of election law 
litigation, the 2008 number, 297 cases, did not beat the 2004 number, 361 cases. See Figure 
1. 
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Figure 3: 2008 Election Challenge Cases in State Courts by Type of Case 
 Figure 1 includes both state and federal court cases, and all kinds of 
election law cases (not just election administration cases). As noted, the 
Democracy Canon has been applied mostly in state courts in state election 
administration cases. Most of the election cases in federal courts have not 
concerned election administration but instead involve election law issues such 
as campaign financing and voting rights. Given this Article’s focus on the 
Canon, it is useful to consider the percentage of election cases heard in state 
courts. As Figure 2 shows, state court cases have made up a majority of 
election challenge cases heard in the courts in every year but one in the last 
twelve years. In the period of the early 2000s, over 80% of the election 
challenge cases were heard in state courts. The figure has dropped somewhat, 
standing at 54% of cases in 2008. See Figure 2. 
Finally, within the class of state election law cases (including both election 
administration cases and other election law cases), statutory interpretation 
questions arise in the vast majority of cases. In 2008, for example, over 81% of 
cases involved either statutory interpretation questions (70.8%) or a mix of 
statutory and constitutional issues (10.6%).98  See Figure 3. 
Thus, the data in this Subpart show that the stakes are high over whether 
state courts should continue to apply the Democracy Canon and whether 
federal courts should begin to apply it in cases under HAVA, UOCAVA, 
NVRA, and future federal election administration statutes. The next Part argues 
in favor of its continued and expanded application. 
98. A list of cases in each category is posted at http://electionlawblog.org/ 
archives/2008-state-demcanon.doc. 
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II. DEFENDING THE DEMOCRACY CANON 
A. The Democracy Canon and General Criticisms of Substantive Canons 
This Part moves from description to prescription, offering a defense of the 
Democracy Canon. The Democracy Canon is a “substantive canon.” 
Substantive canons “are generally meant to reflect a judicially preferred policy 
position. . . . [They] reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ 
understanding of how to treat statutory text with reference to judicially 
perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common law practices, or 
specific statutorily based policies.”99  Among the most important substantive 
canons are the rule of lenity (a “rule against applying punitive sanctions if there 
is ambiguity as to underlying criminal liability or criminal penalty”100); the 
avoidance canon (courts should “avoid interpretations that would render a 
statute unconstitutional or that would raise serious constitutional 
difficulties”101); and a host of “federalism” canons protecting state sovereignty 
against congressional intrusion.102 
Substantive canons stand in contrast to language canons, which  
consist of predictive guidelines as to what the legislature likely meant based 
on its choice of certain words rather than others, or its grammatical 
configuration of those words in a given sentence, or the relationship between 
those words and text found in other parts of the same statute or in similar 
statutes. 103   
One of the most important language canons, discussed in Part III below, is the 
expressio unius canon: “expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of 
others.”104 
Substantive canons are quite controversial.105  Eskridge and Frickey have 
defended them as part of an “interpretive regime” serving rule of law and 
99. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
100. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, app. B at 32. 
101. Id. at app. B at 29. On the canon generally, see Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe 
to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing 
Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397 (2005). On the 
question of whether the executive branch should apply the avoidance canon in interpreting 
statutes, see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006). On the inconsistent use of the avoidance canon by the Roberts 
Court, see Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance at the Roberts 
Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2010), draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436669. 
102. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, app. B at 30-32; see also infra Parts III, IV. 
103. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 99, at 12. 
104. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, app. B at 19. 
105. See id. at 945 (describing “intellectual warfare” over the canons). This is true even 
of newly discovered canons. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity 
Church: The Unique National Institution Canon, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009). 
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coordination functions.106  That is, substantive canons can act as gap-filling 
devices that provide clarity for the law and allow courts to signal policy 
preferences to legislatures, who may draft around such preferences when 
desired.107  Eskridge further defends them as a means for enforcing public 
values found in “the Constitution, in other statutes, or in the common law.”108 
It is not my intention here to provide a general defense of substantive 
canons. Instead, I argue that if any substantive canons are going to be used by 
the courts—and Anglo-American courts have accepted some substantive 
canons as legitimate for at least 400 years109—the Democracy Canon should 
be. As I explain, the Canon serves important public purposes and some of the 
general criticisms of substantive canons do not apply to the Democracy Canon. 
This Subpart notes the main general criticisms of substantive canons and points 
out, where applicable, why the Democracy Canon is not subject to some of 
these criticisms. The next Subpart makes two affirmative arguments in favor of 
the continued use and expansion to federal courts of the Democracy Canon. 
Justice Scalia, one of the most prominent critics of substantive canons, 
nicely states the oft-heard main objections. He argues against substantive 
canons, which he characterizes as “the use of certain presumptions and rules of 
construction that load the dice for or against a particular result.”110  Calling 
substantive canons “a lot of trouble” to “the honest textualist,”111  Justice 
Scalia describes them as indeterminate,112  leading to “unpredictability, if not 
arbitrariness” of judicial decisions. He also questions “where the courts get the 
authority to impose them,”113  doubting whether courts can “really just decree 
that we will interpret the laws that Congress passes to mean less or more than 
what they fairly say[.]”114 
Justice Scalia surely is right that substantive canons “load the dice” or 
constitute a “thumb on the scale” as courts engage in statutory interpretation. 
And if courts were writing on a clean slate, it might be that the best course 
would be to recognize no substantive canons. But courts have long used 
substantive rules to color their interpretations of statutes, and few lawmakers in 
Congress or state legislatures appear to have questioned courts’ legitimacy in 
doing so as a general matter. Indeed, even Justice Scalia recognizes the validity 
of some traditional substantive canons. Discussing the avoidance canon, he 
106. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66 (1994). 
107. Id. at 66-69. 
108. Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1018.  
109. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 99, at 8. 
110. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
111. Id. at 28. 
112. Id. (“[I]t is virtually impossible to expect uniformity and objectivity when there is 
added, on one or the other side of the balance, a thumb of indeterminate weight.”). 
113. Id. at 29. 
114. Id. 
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argues, without elaboration, that “constitutional doubt may validly be used to 
affect the interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”115  Concerning the rule of 
lenity, he “suppose[s] that [it] is validated by sheer antiquity” given that the 
canon “is almost as old as the common law itself.”116  (On this basis, the long-
standing Democracy Canon also should fare quite well.) He also defends the 
clear statement rule for finding congressional abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity and for finding congressional waiver of its own immunity as “merely 
an exaggerated statement of what normal, no-thumb-on-the-scales 
interpretation would produce anyway.”117  In this context, he appears to view 
use of the federalism canons as a kind of harmless error. These views might 
explain why Justice Scalia has chosen to concur in a fair number of Supreme 
Court cases relying on substantive canons.118 
In the end, despite his rhetoric Justice Scalia seems less disturbed by the 
use of substantive canons generally than by the use of particular substantive 
canons. He takes aim at canons that seem to him to be especially indeterminate 
or unwise, such as the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law 
should be strictly construed,119  and that “remedial statutes” should be liberally 
construed to achieve their purposes.120   
The fair question, given the ubiquity of substantive canons today, is 
whether a particular substantive canon is justified on strong policy grounds. 
More precisely, as Trevor Morrison argues, “the deployment of any particular 
canon should come only after careful consideration of the values it is meant to 
serve, as well as the fit between those values and the context of the 
interpretation.”121  Acceptance or rejection of the Democracy Canon, then, 
should be done on its own terms, regardless of criticism that might well apply 
to other substantive canons. The next Subpart offers compelling reasons for 
accepting the Canon. 
The indeterminacy point about substantive canons is a more serious 
objection.122  In a path-breaking study, James Brudney and Corey Ditslear 
115. Id. at 20 n.22. 
116. Id. at 29. 
117. Id. 
118. According to the study by Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 99, at 50, Justice Scalia 
did not rely upon substantive canons in any of his written opinions on workplace law from 
1989-2003. “Justice Scalia, however, does regularly join majority opinions that rely on the 
substantive canons, and he has not distanced himself from such reasoning in separate 
concurrence as he has often done with respect to legislative history reliance by the majority.” 
Id. at 51 n.180. He also has written opinions outside the context of workplace law relying on 
the avoidance canon. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005).  
119. SCALIA, supra note 110, at 29. 
120. Id. at 28. Justice Scalia laid out his attack on this particular canon in Antonin 
Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 
581-86 (1990). He notes that there is not even general agreement over what a “remedial 
statute” is. Id. at 583-84. 
121. Morrison, supra note 101, at 1192 n.9. 
122. William Popkin offers two reasons for the indeterminacy of the application of 
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examined more than six hundred Supreme Court cases on workplace law from 
1969 to 2003 to see how the Supreme Court used language and substantive 
canons in opinions. They “discovered little evidence to support legal process 
scholars’ claims that the canons serve as consistent or predictable guides to 
statutory meaning.”123  To the contrary, the authors found that majority 
opinions relying on language canons were met with dissents similarly relying 
on language canons, and majority opinions relying on substantive canons 
challenged by dissenting opinions similarly relying on substantive canons. 
“Such results suggest that the Justices themselves are inclined to disagree about 
the clarity or predictability of canon-based reasoning.”124 
Even worse, the authors found evidence that the canons were used “in an 
instrumental if not ideologically conscious manner.” Their empirical study 
found “that canon usage by Justices identified as liberals tends to be linked to 
liberal outcomes, and canon reliance by conservative Justices to be associated 
with conservative outcomes.”125  Moreover, “[d]octrinal analysis of illustrative 
[workplace law] decisions indicates that conservative members of the 
Rehnquist Court are using the canons in such contested cases to ignore—and 
thereby undermine—the demonstrable legislative preferences of Congress.”126  
Other scholars have similarly argued that the canons are “a façade, useful to 
support decisions that reflect judicial policy preferences notwithstanding a 
different congressional intent.”127 
Given this evidence of indeterminacy, how can reliance on the Democracy 
Canon be justified? As discussed in Parts III and IV below, there is a danger 
that the Canon’s use can be politicized by the courts, leading to indeterminate 
results. However, in the event politicization and indeterminacy become 
problems, legislatures have tools to rein in the courts.  
substantive canons. “First, the interaction of the canons with both the statute’s text and 
purpose varies too widely to provide much certainty. . . . Second, the canons cannot provide 
sufficient certainty in application because their weight varies over time.” WILLIAM D. 
POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
201 (1999); see also EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET 
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 2 (2008) (“[T]here appear to be no consistently followed rules about 
which canons to invoke in particular cases.”); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The 
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 653 
(1994) (“Under the traditional approach, judges have the ‘power’ to choose between 
competing, reasonable interpretations of a statute, and to choose from among a long list of 
canons of construction that often embody highly contestable normative choices.”). 
123. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 99, at 6. 
124. Id. at 6-7. 
125. Id. at 6. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 10. Brudney and Ditslear cite Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl 
Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562 
(1992); Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical 
Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV. 579, 590 (1992); and David L. 
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 958-59 
(1992). 
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In sum, though the Democracy Canon could not survive a successful 
argument against all substantive canons on grounds they are indeterminate 
“dice loading” rules, that argument is outside the realm of the real world of 
adjudication in which substantive canons are routinely used by courts. Given 
the reality that courts have used and are likely to continue to use substantive 
canons for the foreseeable future, the question is how the Canon fares 
compared to other substantive canons. I turn to examine this question in more 
detail. 
Before proceeding, I want to make clear that I am not arguing that the 
Democracy Canon should always trump other canons of construction or policy 
concerns. For example, in particular cases the Canon might be trumped by 
issues such as “fairness to candidates, avoiding voter confusion, efficiency in 
preparing and distributing ballots, and prevention of last-minute 
manipulation.”128  Nor am I taking a position on whether the Canon should be 
deployed through a clear statement rule rather than as part of a “presumption” 
or something on the “checklist.” My argument is more modest: it is that the 
Democracy Canon deserves application in appropriate cases, and that courts 
that rely on the Canon should be seen as engaging in a legitimate act of 
statutory interpretation, and not—in the federal context—in improper result-
oriented judging that usurps the power of state legislatures. 
B. Two Arguments for the Democracy Canon 
1.  Enforcing an underenforced constitutional right 
Sometimes the Supreme Court, “because of institutional concerns, has 
failed to enforce a provision of the Constitution to its full conceptual 
boundaries.”129  Legislation scholars have long recognized that substantive 
canons can serve as a backdoor mechanism to enforce “underenforced” 
constitutional norms through statutory interpretation.130  As Eskridge explains: 
“While a Court that seeks to avoid constitutional activism will be reluctant to 
invalidate federal statutes in close cases, it might seek other ways to protect 
constitutional norms. One way is through canons of statutory construction.”131 
Frickey describes how the rule of lenity, for example, can serve this role. 
128. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 948. 
129. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978). 
130. See generally Eskridge, supra note 21; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 106; 
Sunstein, supra note 21. 
131. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 286 (1994); 
see also Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Making Laws Moral: A Defense of Substantive Canons of 
Construction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 915, 962 (“Reliance on substantive canons of construction 
provides a method for enforcing typically underenforced constitutional and political norms 
that does not require the Court to use judicial review, a power that should only be employed 
when it is absolutely necessary to vindicate the Constitution.”). 
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He explains: 
In a criminal justice system that provides essentially no meaningful 
constitutional limitations upon prosecutorial discretion, this canon provides a 
judicial justification for trimming expansive statutory language which might 
provide tempting opportunities to overzealous or improperly motivated 
prosecutors. It also helps implement the constitutional due-process value of 
fair notice, at a time when the “void for vagueness” notion in constitutional 
law is rarely invoked to terminate a prosecution on constitutional grounds.132 
The Democracy Canon similarly can serve to enforce underenforced 
constitutional norms of equality in voting. Courts that use the Democracy 
Canon to resolve election disputes can avoid deciding constitutional issues also 
raised by the cases.133  For example, in State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner,134  the 
2008 absentee ballot application “check box” case described above,135  the 
Ohio Supreme Court was able to avoid deciding a constitutional equal 
protection challenge to the Ohio statute through its statutory decision that 
voters did not need to check the qualifications box to be entitled to an absentee 
ballot.136 
Recall the purposes to be served by the Democracy Canon: “favoring free, 
competitive elections,”137  recognizing that the right to vote “is a part of the 
very warp and woof of the American ideal and it is a right protected by both the 
constitutions of the United States and of the state,”138  and allowing “the 
greatest scope for public participation in the electoral process, to allow 
candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the 
ballot, and most importantly to allow the voters a choice on Election Day.”139 
It turns out that these rights, though constitutional in nature, are seriously 
underenforced. 
It might seem odd to say that the right to vote is an underenforced right 
given the amount of election law litigation, especially in recent years. But these 
are not rights that have proven easy to vindicate through constitutional 
132. Frickey, supra note 32, at 129. Frickey offers a similar justification for the 
federalism canons. Id. at 129-30. 
133. Recall that in 2008, over 10% of state “election challenge” cases raised both 
statutory and constitutional issues. 
134. 899 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 2008). 
135. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
136. Myles, 899 N.E.2d at 124 n.2 (“Relators further claim that they are entitled to the 
requested writ of mandamus because the secretary’s instructions violated the Voting Rights 
Act and the Equal Protection Clause. Our holding renders these claims moot.” (citing State 
State ex rel. Barletta v. Fersch, 791 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ohio 2003) (“[W]e will not issue 
advisory opinions, and this rule applies equally to election cases.”); State ex rel. DeBrosse v. 
Cool, 716 N.E.2d 1114, 1119 (Ohio 1999) (“Courts decide constitutional issues only when 
absolutely necessary.”))). 
137. State ex rel. White v. Franklin County Bd. Of Elections, 598 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 
(Ohio 1992). 
138. State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899, 905-06 (Ohio 1948). 
139. Catania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d 374, 379 (N.J. 1991). 
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adjudication. The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution does not 
confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the right to vote, per se, is 
not a constitutionally protected right.”140  In Bush v. Gore, 141  the Supreme 
Court reminded us that “[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional 
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until 
the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its 
power to appoint members of the electoral college” and indeed that “[t]he 
State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, 
can take back the power to appoint electors.”142 
So despite the longstanding democratic ideals of this nation, one cannot 
constitutionally enforce a “right to vote.”143  Instead, the claims must be 
grounded in a particular provision of the Constitution such as that guaranteeing 
equal protection,144  or barring discrimination on the basis of race,145  
gender,146  or age of at least eighteen years.147 
Yet even the broadest of these protections, the Equal Protection Clause, 
has not been fully enforced by the Supreme Court. The Court during the 
Warren years did use the Equal Protection Clause to end some of the structural 
barriers to voting.148  It established the one person, one vote principle,149  
barred the use of poll taxes in state elections,150  and made it difficult to deny 
the franchise to an otherwise eligible voter on grounds of lack of sufficient 
“interest” in the outcome of elections.151  But in the kinds of cases typically 
considered152  by courts applying the Democracy Canon—problems with the 
form of the ballot, or how voters have cast their ballots, or which candidates 
appear on the ballot—the Court has underenforced equal protection values. 
This underenforcement has become clear in the wake of Bush v. Gore. In 
140. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9 (1982) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted) (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 
(1874); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973)). 
141. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
142. Id. 
143. For this reason, some have advocated that the Constitution be amended to include 
a right to vote, at least for the President. See Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for 
the U.S. Constitution: Confronting America’s Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 
559 (2004). 
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
148. For a general overview, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 14-56 (2003).  
149. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964). 
150. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). Two years earlier, the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified, ending the use of poll 
taxes in federal elections. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
151. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631 (1969). 
152. For examples, see supra Part I.A. 
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that case, the Court declared that: 
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the 
franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. 
Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by 
later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of 
another.153   
But, despite this lofty and general language, the promise of constitutional 
protection of equal protection in voting rights embodied in this sentence of 
Bush v. Gore has not been realized.154  Though some federal appellate courts 
have read the sentence in a broad manner, for example to protect voters against 
the use of inaccurate punch card voting machines in some parts of a jurisdiction 
but not in others,155  those opinions have been reversed or mooted by en banc 
circuit courts that appear more skittish about fully enforcing equal protection 
rights in voting.156  At least so far, the project of using Bush v. Gore in a 
“lemonade from lemons” litigation strategy to expand equal protection rights 
has been a failure.157 
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board158  illustrates the difficult procedural hurdles faced by litigants 
raising equal protection challenges in the context of election administration 
cases. In the highly fractured decision, six Justices (the Stevens plurality and 
three dissenters) recognized that it could be an equal protection violation in 
certain contexts to require a voter to produce photo identification in order to 
vote. But in order to mount such a challenge, a voter would have to bring an 
“as applied” challenge to the law, a difficult and cumbersome process that 
likely will leave a good chunk of those whose rights have been violated without 
a constitutional remedy.159 
Crawford and another Supreme Court case decided in the October 2007 
153. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000). 
154. Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
155.  Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 859-60 (6th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 473 
F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007); Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 
894-96 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003). 
156. Stewart, 473 F.3d at 693-94; Shelley, 344 F.3d at 918. For a discussion, see 
Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 2, at 9-15. 
157. See Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 2, pt. I. On the “lemonade from lemons” 
strategy, see Steven J. Mulroy, Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. 
Gore Into a Vehicle for Reform?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 357 (2002). 
158. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
159. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied 
Challenges in Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2009); Julien Kern, As-Applied 
Constitutional Challenges, Class Actions, and Other Strategies: Potential Solutions to 
Challenging Voter Identification Laws After Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 42 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2009); Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing 
Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the 
Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2009). 
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term, the Washington State Grange case,160  have made it more difficult for 
plaintiffs raising election law challenges to succeed in constitutional litigation 
in another way as well. Besides shunting many suits to “as applied” rather than 
facial challenges, the Court also imposed a tough anti-plaintiff, pro-state 
evidentiary standard. As I have explained, under these cases, the state need not 
provide any evidence supporting the state interests it posits as justifying its law. 
In contrast, plaintiffs challenging the law need to provide hard evidence that 
the statute imposes a heavy burden on them.161 
More generally, given the relevant balancing tests articulated by the 
Supreme Court, and as refined by Crawford, constitutional adjudication over 
the “nuts and bolts” of elections leaves plaintiffs facing an uphill battle, but 
without clear constitutional rules from the Supreme Court.162  In this 
constitutional environment, statutory interpretation (and state constitutional 
law163) remains a more useful tool to enforce underenforced equal protection 
rights in voting than straight-out constitutional adjudication. 
2. The Democracy Canon as a preference-eliciting mechanism for the 
legislature 
Legislation scholars have long recognized that substantive canons can 
serve as “preference-eliciting”164  mechanisms for the legislature. Frickey notes 
that interpretations following substantive canons sometimes “amount to 
160. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008). 
161. See Rick L. Hasen, About Face: The Roberts Court Sets the Stage for Shrinking 
Voting Rights, Putting Poor and Minority Voters Especially in Danger, FINDLAW’S WRIT, 
Mar. 26, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/20080326_hasen.html.  
162. A recent article by Christopher S. Elmendorf and Edward B. Foley articulates the 
lack of guidance for lower courts: 
Absent a Supreme Court precedent squarely on point, it is now open to a lower court 
working within this framework (1) to engage in unmediated, all-things-considered balancing, 
focusing either on the overall reasonableness of the challenged law or on the reasonableness 
of exempting or otherwise accommodating the plaintiff or plaintiff-class; (2) to apply strict 
scrutiny after determining that the law (relative to some practicable alternative) has a large, 
demonstrable adverse impact on voting, political association, or the competitiveness of 
campaigns; (3) to apply strict scrutiny after identifying a facial attribute of the law itself that 
renders it suspect in the judge’s eye; (4) to apply extremely deferential review because the 
law does not have attributes that the judge deems facially suspect and because the judge is 
leery of getting bogged down in empirical debates or indulging in the guess work of open-
ended balancing; or (5) to reject the plaintiff’s claim after positing that it raises questions 
about democratic fairness concerning which there is no discernable historical consensus. 
Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the 
Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 507, 536-37 (2008). 
163. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006) (striking down 
Missouri photo identification law for voting under state constitutional equal protection 
clause and relying upon state constitution’s express “right to vote” provision). 
164. The term appears in ELHAUGE, supra note 122, but the concept predates Elhauge’s 
work, as the discussion of Frickey’s and Eskridge’s points in the next two sentences of the 
text makes clear. 
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suspensive vetoes—‘remands’ to the legislature—that may foster legislative 
deliberation on important constitutional values but ultimately leave the 
legislature with the authority to override the judicial decision.”165  Eskridge 
remarks that clear statement rules “[u]ltimately . . . may even be democracy-
enhancing by focusing the political process on the values enshrined in the 
Constitution.”166  Thus, for example, the avoidance canon “makes it harder for 
Congress to enact constitutionally questionable statutes and forces legislators to 
reflect and deliberate before plunging into constitutionally sensitive issues.”167 
The major criticism of the preference-eliciting argument for substantive 
canons is that it assumes legislatures will have the time and will to overrule 
incorrect judicial interpretations of statutes. If in fact legislatures cannot go 
back and consider such issues on “remand,” then the use of a clear statement 
rule or presumption by the court essentially imposes the judicial rule on the 
polity.168  However, there are a few reasons to be hopeful that use of the 
Democracy Canon will be preference-eliciting when necessary. 
165. Frickey, supra note 32, at 131. 
166. ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 287; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1992). 
167. ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 286. 
168. Vermeule argues against preference-eliciting (what he calls “democracy-forcing”) 
rules on grounds that the theory behind the rules assumes incorrectly that there will be 
“sustained judicial coordination on a particular interpretive approach or canonical regime.” 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 123 (2006). But it is unclear to me why sustained judicial coordination 
would be necessary for a “remand” to the legislature to be effective; the relevant question is 
whether there will be action in response to a particular statute. 
 One way to mitigate the problem of legislative inertia is to follow Elhauge’s suggestion 
that the judiciary choose preference-eliciting rules that differ from the likely political 
preferences of the legislature “in order to elicit a legislative response that makes it clearer 
precisely where enactable preferences lie.” ELHAUGE, supra note 122, at 12. For example, 
Elhauge explains a recent pro-Guantanamo detainee opinion of the Supreme Court in this 
manner: “Given the lack of political clout these detainees had, it was entirely predictable that 
this decision would, as it did, elicit a statutory override, which made clear precisely where 
enactable preferences lay on the trial rights of detainees in the war on terror.” Id. However, 
the danger of choosing deliberately provocative interpretations is that the provocation might 
fail, and then the polity would be stuck with an interpretation disfavored by the legislature 
and perhaps by the judiciary as well. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the 
Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 92 (2008) (arguing that given the 
reality that Congress rarely responds to judicial statutory interpretations, “clear statement 
canons, while purportedly leaving enforcement of norms to the political process, may simply 
provide ‘a backdoor way’ for the interpreter to proceed and resolve normative questions—
and the underlying meaning of statutes—themselves”). For this reason, Elhauge advocates 
his preference-eliciting strategy only as a third resort. It should be used only when both 
“current” and “enactor” legislative preferences are unclear, and when “the chosen 
interpretation is more likely to elicit a legislative response, by a margin sufficient to 
outweigh a weak estimate that another interpretation is more likely to match enactable 
preferences.” ELHAUGE, supra note 122, at 12. For a general critique of Elhauge’s 
framework, see Elizabeth Garrett, Preferences, Laws and Default Rules, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
2104 (2009) (book review). 
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First, election law cases are highly salient, and the rules governing who 
votes and how elections are conducted are of keen interest to legislators, who 
were elected under existing rules and have a vested interest in how the rules are 
being interpreted. States have not always passed laws expanding the franchise, 
and indeed legislators have no doubt sometimes been influenced by partisan 
considerations in the drafting of ballot access, voter registration, and other 
election laws. The Democracy Canon can flush out legislators who would hide 
an anti-enfranchisement provision in a vague statute. 
Second, election law issues have been the site of increasing partisan 
warfare in legislatures, in secretary of state offices, and in the courts.169  
Legislators do not necessarily trust partisan election officials who run state 
elections, or the courts, which some see as being driven by partisan 
consideration in deciding election law cases. For this reason, legislatures are 
likely to pay keen attention to judicial (and administrative) determinations of 
the meaning of election law statutes to make sure there is not a partisan bias 
against the interests of the legislative majority. 
Third, since 2000, the press and public have paid unprecedented attention 
to the nuts and bolts of elections, from the machinery of voting, to the rules of 
registration, down to apparently technical questions about how voters’ names 
are purged from the voter rolls. Every state wants to avoid being the next 
“Florida.” Legislators therefore have good reason to examine the statutory 
interpretation decisions of courts construing the state’s election laws to make 
sure they will not lead to an embarrassing disaster. 
Indeed, Florida itself reacted to the decisions of the Florida Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Florida statutes during the 2000 election controversy 
by (1) eliminating the “protest” phase for election challenges;170  (2) changing 
the conditions for when a manual recount is triggered;171  (3) requiring 
recounts to be conducted jurisdiction-wide, with a look at both undervotes and 
overvotes;172  and (4) requiring the use of written standards for judging the 
intent of the voter in ballots examined during an election contest.173 
169. See Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 2, at 18-20 (recounting election 
administration wars in the states). 
170. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West 2008); Clifford A. Jones, Out of Guatemala?: 
Election Law Reform in Florida and the Legacy of Bush v. Gore in the 2004 Presidential 
Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 121, 133 (2006). 
171. Jones, supra note 170, at 127-28. 
172. Id. at 133. 
173. Id. at 127. To be sure, state legislators do not always react to solve such problems: 
For example, given that there were over twenty lawsuits brought challenging one or another 
aspect of California recall law in 2003, the California legislature has done nothing to fix the 
obvious contradictions and problems with the California Elections Code. My favorite 
example is the internal code contradiction on the rules for nominating someone to be a 
replacement candidate in the event voters choose to recall a sitting governor. The recall rules 
state that the ‘usual nomination rules shall apply’ to recall elections. And the first of the 
‘usual nomination rules’ provides that the rules do not apply to recall elections. The 
California Secretary of State then applied the rules (which normally apply to primary 
elections) requiring that candidates wishing to run for governor in the recall provide only 65 
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Though these three reasons suggest that judicial interpretation of election 
laws will be preference eliciting at least some of the time, there is one 
important counter-argument: legislatures might be deterred from reacting to 
election law statutory decisions that have misperceived legislative intent 
because legislators do not want to take heat for reversing a “pro-voter” decision 
of the courts. Consider how the Alaska Supreme Court put it in articulating a 
clear statement rule: “If in the interests of the purity of the ballot the vote of 
one not morally at fault is to be declared invalid, the Legislature must say so in 
clear and unmistakable terms.”174  Who wants to pass a clean-up statute that 
could be viewed as going against the voting rights of those “not morally at 
fault”? 
This concern that legislators will be reluctant to express their true 
preferences against the interests of at least some voters, however, is likely 
overstated. Consider the ongoing battles over voter identification rules. 
Republicans in the Texas Senate almost passed a voter identification rule on a 
party line vote in 2008, only to be stopped by a Democratic filibuster which 
required that a Democratic senator recovering from a liver transplant stay in a 
hospital bed at the state capitol.175  In 2009, the Texas Senate, on another party 
line vote, changed its rules so that the voter identification rules could be passed 
by a simple majority and could not be filibustered.176  In Missouri, despite the 
state supreme court decision that a photo identification law for voting violated 
the state constitution, state legislators are considering new identification 
legislation.177  Legislators in the highly partisan battles over election 
administration have not shied away from what might be perceived by some as 
anti-voter positions. The Democracy Canon forces legislators to make their 
intent more visible to all, and experience tells us that legislators sometimes are 
willing to pay that price. 
In sum, especially in our world of polarized politics and partisan mistrust, 
state court decisions applying the Democracy Canon are quite likely to elicit 
responses from legislators that disagree with such decisions.  
signatures and $3,000, leading to the unwieldy 2003 election and ballot featuring 135 
candidates for governor, including the child actor Gary Coleman, a porn star, and a 
watermelon-smashing Gallagher. 
Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 2, at 18. 
174. Carr v. Thomas, 586 P.2d 622, 626-27 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Sanchez v. Bravo, 
251 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)). 
175. Mark Lisheron, Ill Senator Settles in for Voter ID Fight, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, 
May 22, 2007, at B1, available at http://www.statesman.com/news/ 
content/region/legislature/stories/05/22/22gallegos.html. 
176. Mike Ward, Texas Senate Adopts Rules Change to Allow Voter ID Vote, 
MARSHALL NEWS MESSENGER, Jan. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.marshallnewsmessenger.com/news/content/region/legislature/stories/01/15/0115
senate.html. 
177. Ian Urbina, Missouri Legislature Ends Session with Voter ID Amendment Still on 
Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2008, at A13, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/17/us/politics/17missouri.html. 
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C. The Context: State Courts and Federal Courts 
Recall Trevor Morrison’s argument that “the deployment of any particular 
canon should come only after careful consideration of the values it is meant to 
serve, as well as the fit between those values and the context of the 
interpretation.”178  Thus, Morrison argues that the avoidance canon should be 
used more broadly by the federal judiciary than by the federal executive branch 
because it serves purposes such as “judicial restraint” which do not apply to the 
executive branch.179 
Most discussion of substantive canons among legislation scholars assumes 
the context of an unelected, relatively unaccountable federal judiciary.180  The 
institutional context of state courts, many containing judges who must run for 
election or reelection (at least in a retention election), should be taken into 
account in evaluating the use of the Democracy Canon. 
For three reasons it is not surprising that state courts in particular have 
embraced the Democracy Canon. First, elected judges are likely to be sensitive 
to the rules for elections. They are also going to be careful in considering the 
opinions of voters—the “crocodile in the bathtub”181—whose voting rights 
should not be minimized, especially near judicial election time. 
Second, in many states legislative history is slim or not easy to obtain.182  
In the absence of reliable legislative history, courts may rely upon certain 
presumptions about the legislature’s likely intentions—such as a desire to 
enfranchise voters—to interpret ambiguous statutes.183 
Third, in many states the Chief Elections Officer of the state is a partisan 
official, who may be tempted to interpret vague or ambiguous election law 
statutes not in the most reasonable way but in a way that will further the 
interests of the officer’s political party.184  Given the political leanings of many 
178. Morrison, supra note 101, at 1193 n.9 (emphasis added).  
179. See generally id. (making sustained argument along these lines). 
180. See, e.g., id. at 1191 n.3 (noting that his article is confined to “interpretation by 
branches of the federal government” and does not “address statutory interpretation at the 
state level, where some judges are democratically elected”); Sunstein, supra note 21, at 468 
(noting that constitutional norms are sometimes underenforced by courts with “limited fact-
finding capability and attenuated electoral accountability”); see also Bamberger, supra note 
168 (discussing how courts should consider substantive canons of interpretation in light of 
statutory interpretation by executive agencies). 
181. Gerald F. Uelmen, Otto Kaus and the Crocodile, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 974 
(1997). 
182. See Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 862-66. 
183. See Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 356 (2004) (positing that a Restatement of Statutory 
Interpretation “might even be more helpful in construing state statutes because the lack of 
legislative history forces state courts to rely more frequently on rules of statutory 
construction”). 
184. See Hasen, Beyond the Margin, supra note 2, at 974-76 (noting that at least thirty-
three state Chief Elections Officers (usually called the “Secretary of State”) are elected in 
partisan elections and that some of the others are partisan appointees).  
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Chief Elections Officers, it seems wrongheaded to adopt deference, as 
suggested by Vermeule,185  to the agency charged with administering statutes 
over canons as the primary interpretive rule. It is more sensible to adopt a 
presumption, such as that contained in the Democracy Canon, which can be 
applied regardless of the shifting partisan positions taken by the agency 
charged with interpreting state election laws. 
In this regard, note how the Ohio Supreme Court recently deferred to the 
Secretary of State (a partisan elected position) when her interpretation (in the 
thirty-day window case) lined up with the Democracy Canon, but rejected her 
interpretation as “unreasonable” (in the check box case) when her interpretation 
conflicted with the Democracy Canon.186   
There are strong reasons to extend the Democracy Canon to federal courts 
as well as they consider more election administration cases. First, ideas 
consistent with the Democracy Canon are contained in the “purpose” language 
of the NVRA and in the “Sense of Congress” portion of UOCAVA.187 
Congress expressed its apparent intent for these voting statutes to be read 
broadly, consistent with an enfranchising purpose. Moreover, federal courts as 
much as state courts need to guard against partisan manipulation of the 
electoral process by elections officials. A rule of deference to state agencies for 
either Chevron-type reasons or federalism reasons is misplaced;188  a thumb on 
the scale favoring the rights of voters is not. Moreover, the same arguments 
favoring the Canon generally—underenforcement and preference elicitation—
apply equally to federal courts. The source of underenforcement is primarily 
the constitutional election law jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which 
pertains equally to state and federal election law.  
Second, Congress since 2000 has struggled with the appropriateness and 
scope of federal election reform. The Democracy Canon applied to federal 
election administration laws such as HAVA can induce Congress to be clearer 
about how strongly federal and state courts should apply the Canon in 
construing federal election administration statutes.  
In sum, the evolution of the Democracy Canon in state courts is 
understandable, but should not be read as an argument against its extension to 
federal courts. The underenforcement and preference-eliciting reasons set forth 
earlier in this Part apply to both federal courts/Congress and state courts/state 
legislatures. 
185. VERMEULE, supra note 168, at 201. 
186. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
188. For a cogent argument on the latter point, see Case Note, Election Law—Statutory 
Interpretation—Sixth Circuit Employs Clear Statement Rule in Holding that the Help 
America Vote Act Does Not Require States to Count Provisional Ballots Cast Outside 
Voters’ Home Precincts.—Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565 
(6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2461, 2468 (2005). 
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III. THE DEMOCRACY CANON AND CONCERNS ABOUT ACTUAL AND 
PERCEIVED POLITICIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY 
A. Introduction 
In Part II, I argued that there are virtues to the Democracy Canon, and that 
many of the arguments raised against substantive canons generally are not 
strong when applied to the Democracy Canon. But thus far I have set aside the 
strongest argument against the use of the Canon: it can play a role in the actual 
and perceived politicization of the judiciary. When judges decide cases using 
the Democracy Canon, there is a danger that their political preferences could 
subconsciously sway how “liberally” they read an ambiguous election 
statute.189  Moreover, the public may view such actions as illegitimate activism 
by a court with a conscious or subconscious desire to help a particular political 
party or candidate. These are legitimate concerns, and ones that counsel for 
caution. But I argue that the danger of actual and perceived politicization 
should be met not with a jettisoning of the Democracy Canon, but with its 
consistent application and an effort to educate the public on the legitimacy and 
longstanding nature of court reliance on the Canon. It is also necessary for 
legislatures to act ex ante to prevent state court overreaching. 
This Part explores the politicization issue arising from use of the 
Democracy Canon through a closer examination of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s Samson opinion. It contrasts the New Jersey Supreme Court’s use of 
the Democracy Canon in Samson with the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of a 
federalism canon in Gregory v. Ashcroft. 
B. New Jersey Democratic Party v. Samson 
New Jersey Democratic Party v. Samson190  arose out of incumbent 
Democratic United States Senator Robert Torricelli’s decision to withdraw 
from his reelection campaign upon facing questions about campaign 
contributions.191  Torricelli withdrew thirty-six days before the general 
189. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 398 (“[W]hen a court decides important 
electoral questions on the basis of ‘substantial compliance’ rather than the rules, the judges 
face the serious danger that their judgment will be affected by their political preferences.”).  
190. 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2002). 
191. Democrats Seek Torricelli Replacement After Pallone Declines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/01/nyregion/01CND-JERS.html (“The legal and 
political maneuvering came a day after Mr. Torricelli announced that he was ending his bid 
for re-election, acknowledging that his campaign had become overwhelmed by questions 
about improper gifts he accepted from a contributor.”). Torricelli was not charged with any 
crime. He later became a lobbyist and faced criticism for using his campaign money to 
donate to politicians with “influence over Mr. Torricelli’s, or his clients’, business interests.” 
Raymond Hernandez & David W. Chen, Now a Lobbyist, an Ex-Senator Uses Campaign 
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/24/nyregion/24torricelli.html. He later created a 
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election.192  Democrats wanted to name a replacement for Torricelli to run 
against the Republican Senate nominee, Douglas Forrester, along with two 
minor party candidates. 
The relevant statute on party replacement of vacancies read: 
In the event of a vacancy, howsoever caused, among candidates nominated at 
primaries, which vacancy shall occur not later than the 51st day before the 
general election, or in the event of inability to select a candidate because of a 
tie vote at such primary, a candidate shall be selected in the following manner:  
 
a. (1) In the case of an office to be filled by the voters of the entire State, the 
candidate shall be selected by the State committee of the political party 
wherein such vacancy has occurred. 
. . . 
d. A selection made pursuant to this section shall be made not later than the 
48th day preceding the date of the general election, and a statement of such 
selection shall be filed with the Secretary of State . . . .193   
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that even though the vacancy 
occurred fewer than fifty-one days before the election, and the Democratic 
Party’s selection of a replacement was to be made fewer than forty-eight days 
before the election, the Democrats could still name a replacement. The decision 
was unanimous among the seven justices, which included four Democrats, two 
Republicans, and an independent.194   
The Samson court relied heavily on the Democracy Canon in reaching its 
ruling, and especially on a string of earlier New Jersey cases which had 
extended filing and other election law deadlines under the authority of the 
Canon. Especially important was the court’s earlier decision in Catania v. 
Haberle,195  in which the court extended a statutory deadline for filling a 
vacancy on the ballot in a special election: 
Concerns have been expressed that by giving this deadline provision a 
directory, rather than mandatory, construction we will create doubts about 
many other sections of the election law, a law that is driven by deadlines. Our 
only response is that this Court has traditionally given a liberal interpretation 
to that law, “liberal” in the sense of construing it to allow the greatest scope 
philanthropic foundation and donated $1.6 million in campaign funds to it. Raymond 
Hernandez, Torricelli Charity Gets Leftover Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at B5, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/nyregion/30torricelli.html.  
192. Democrats Seek Torricelli Replacement, supra note 191. 
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-20 (West 2009). The statute has been amended three 
times since Samson. The first time the statute was amended the reference to “Secretary of 
State” in section (d) was changed to “Attorney General.” Act of June 16, 2004, 2004 N.J. 
Sess. Law Serv. ch. 26, § 2 (West 2004). In 2005 and 2009, the legislature made additional, 
non-substantive amendments to the statute. 2005 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 136, § 21 (West 
2005), effective Jan. 1, 2006; 2009 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 135, § 5 (West 2009), effective 
Oct. 2, 2009. 
194. David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Court Lets Lautenberg into Senate Race, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002, at A1. 
195. 588 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1990).  
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for public participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get on 
the ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot, and most 
importantly to allow the voters a choice on Election Day. Obviously, there 
will be cases in which provisions must be interpreted strictly, mandatorily, for 
in some cases it will be apparent that that interpretation serves important state 
interests, including orderly electoral processes. But those cases must be 
decided on their own facts, under the law involved. This Court has never 
announced that time limitations in election statutes should be construed to bar 
candidates from the ballot when that makes no sense and when it is obviously 
not the Legislature’s intent. There are states that have such rules, but New 
Jersey is not one of them.196 
After discussing the Canon and these cases, the Samson court rejected an 
argument that the plain language of the statute precluded filling a vacancy 
fewer than forty-eight days before the election: 
By its terms, [the statute] establishes an absolute right in a State committee to 
replace a candidate up to and including the forty-eighth day before the general 
election. Here, we confront a vacancy created outside of the statutory window. 
Nothing in [the statute] addresses the precise question whether a vacancy that 
occurs between the forty-eighth day and the general election can, in that 
circumstance, be filled.197 
The court contrasted New Jersey’s vacancy statute with other vacancy 
statutes, including Colorado’s, which stated that any vacancy occurring less 
than eighteen days before the general election shall not be filled before the 
general election.198   
The court, having concluded that the legislature did not intend to “limit 
voters’ choice in a case where there is sufficient time to place a new candidate 
on the ballot and conduct the new election in an orderly manner,”199 
considered whether the election could still be conducted in such a manner. One 
concern was whether it would disenfranchise military and other overseas 
voters. The court satisfied itself that replacement ballots could be mailed out 
and returned in time, and generally that election officials could manage a 
change in the ballots in time for the election.200  It ordered the Democratic 
Party to pay any extra costs associated with the late change in candidates. 
The main criticism of the New Jersey Supreme Court was that its decision 
went against the apparently clear words of the statute. New Jersey Republican 
Party Chairman Joseph M. Kyrillos called the ruling that a change could be 
made fewer than forty-eight days before the election “absurd.”201  U.S. Senator 
Bill Frist, then chairman of the Senate G.O.P. campaign committee, called the 
196. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1036 (N.J. 2002) (quoting 
Catania, 588 A.2d at 379). 
197. Id. at 1037 (footnote omitted). 
198. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-1002(2.5)(a) (West 2002)). 
199. Id. at 1039. 
200. Id. at 1039-40. 
201. Kocieniewski, supra note 194, at B6. 
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argument to extend the time “a desperate grasp at getting around the law.”202 
But did the New Jersey Supreme Court in Samson really “bend the rules” 
to achieve the “desirable goal” to “permit candidates from each of the major 
parties to appear on the ballot in a Senate election”?203  Did it employ a “legal 
fiction” in stating that the statute was silent on the question of filling vacancies 
in fewer than forty-eight days?204  No.  
The court was surely right that the statute did not expressly bar a party 
from choosing a replacement candidate fewer than forty-eight days before the 
election. Indeed, Bill Baroni, one of Forrester’s lawyers, conceded in a law 
journal article written after the case ended that “[t]he statute is silent as to what 
would happen after the forty-eighth day.”205 
To reach the conclusion that the statute barred a party from filling a 
vacancy in a time shorter than forty-eight days before the election, one had to 
(at least implicitly) apply the expressio unius linguistic canon of construction: 
the inclusion of one thing (the right to fill vacancies at least forty-eight days 
before the election) indicated the exclusion of the other (no right to fill 
vacancies in forty-eight days or fewer). As Justice Scalia put it in talking about 
the expressio unius canon generally: “What [the expressio unius canon] means 
is this: If you see a sign that says children under twelve may enter free, you 
should have no need to ask whether your thirteen-year-old must pay. The 
inclusion of the one class is an implicit exclusion of the other.”206 
I concede that reading the New Jersey statute in light of the expressio unius 
canon alone leads to the conclusion that replacements are not allowed fewer 
than forty-eight days before the election. Indeed, this is the most natural 
reading of the statute purely as a linguistic matter. But as Professor Mullins has 
remarked, the reality of language in context is often more complex than “a 
simple matter of twelve-year-olds.”207  In the context of New Jersey statutory 
interpretation of election laws, the Samson interpretation followed the rules 
rather than bent them. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, which had consistently used the 
202. Terence Neilan, New Jersey Supreme Court Rules Torricelli Can Be Replaced, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/02/nyregion/02CND-JER.html. 
203. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 399. 
204. David L. Evans, Jr., Case Note, New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson: 
What Remains of New Jersey’s Election Deadlines?, 32 STETSON L. REV. 897, 904-05 
(2003). But see id. at 908-09 (noting lack of “explicit language [in statute] concerning 
whether a vacancy that occurs after the forth-eighth day, but before the general election can 
be filled”). 
205. William E. Baroni, Jr., Administrative Unfeasibility: The Torricelli Replacement 
Case and the Creation of a New Election Law Standard, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 53, 61 
(2002). He added that it was “presumed that nothing could” happen after the forty-eighth 
day. Id. at 61-62. 
206. SCALIA, supra note 110, at 25. 
207. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory 
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 24 n.103 (2003). 
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Democracy Canon to extend deadlines for the benefit of voters, had long ago 
created a de facto clear statement rule when it came to statutory deadlines. The 
court essentially said that if the New Jersey legislature wanted a stricter statute, 
it needed to use unmistakably clear language like Colorado. As the Samson 
court observed:  
Our cases repeatedly have construed the election laws liberally, consonant 
with their purpose and with practical considerations related to process. We are 
aware of only one instance in which the Legislature amended an election 
provision to prevent the filling of a vacancy, effectively overriding the 
decision of this Court . . . .208   
Indeed, despite criticism of the Samson opinion, the New Jersey Legislature 
has not amended its vacancy statute to impose clearer language.209 
C. Gregory v. Ashcroft 
Not only was the result in Samson consistent with the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s earlier election law jurisprudence, its approach also mirrors the United 
States Supreme Court’s approach in some of its own statutory interpretation 
cases. Accordingly, Samson is not “rule bending” in that it follows the United 
States Supreme Court in applying substantive canons with clear statement rules 
for policy reasons in appropriate cases. 
Consider Gregory v. Ashcroft.210  In Gregory, Missouri state judges 
challenged a provision of the Missouri state constitution imposing a mandatory 
retirement age of seventy for judges. The state judges argued that the 
retirement provision violated a federal statute, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”).211  Though the ADEA expressly applied 
to state employees,212  Missouri argued that the state judges did not constitute 
“employees” as defined by the statute: 
The term “employee” means an individual employed by any employer except 
that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office 
in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters 
thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal 
staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with 
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.213 
The State of Missouri argued that judges, appointed in Missouri but subject 
to retention elections, were appointees “on the policymaking level” and 
208. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1039 n.6 (N.J. 2002) 
(citing Fields v. Hoffman, 520 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1987)). 
209. See supra note 193 (explaining non-substantive changes to statute since Samson). 
210. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
211. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. The state judges also raised a federal constitutional claim 
under the Equal Protection Clause, but the Supreme Court rejected the Equal Protection 
claim. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473. I ignore the constitutional claim in this analysis. 
212. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2). 
213. Id. § 630(f) (emphasis added). 
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therefore exempt from the coverage of the ADEA.214 
A court might apply a number of language canons to decide whether 
judges should be considered “on the policymaking level” for purposes of the 
ADEA.215  The result of such an analysis is not obvious. Indeed, in interpreting 
the statute, the Supreme Court conceded that “[i]t is at least ambiguous whether 
a state judge is an ‘appointee on the policymaking level.’”216  But the Court 
held that in the circumstances of this case, it was appropriate to put a fat thumb 
on the scale to protect state sovereignty and federalism values: 
[I]n this case we are not looking for a plain statement that judges are excluded 
[from coverage under the ADEA]. We will not read the ADEA to cover state 
judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are included. This does 
not mean that the Act must mention judges explicitly, though it does not. 
Rather, it must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers judges.217 
This “super-strong clear statement rule”218  for federalism reasons 
functions just like the Democracy Canon in New Jersey. It allows courts to 
reach results in statutory interpretation cases on policy grounds that are not 
necessarily the most natural reading of a statute when considering only the 
language of the statute.  
D. The Danger of Actual and Perceived Politicization 
I am not arguing that either Samson or Gregory was correctly decided.219  
Rather, I argue that they are both part of a longstanding tradition in statutory 
interpretation cases to rely upon substantive canons and clear statement rules to 
put a “thumb on the scale” for particular policy reasons. “By their nature, 
[substantive] canons are judicial determinations that the words of a statute 
mean something different than the conventional understanding of the text 
would dictate.”220  The New Jersey Supreme Court’s reliance in Samson on the 
Democracy Canon was no less legitimate than the United States Supreme 
Court’s reliance in Gregory on federalism canons. 
214. The Court did not reach the alternative question whether judges would be subject 
to exemption under the “person elected to public office” exemption. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 
467. 
215. For a thorough analysis, see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 933-36. 
216. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.  
217. Id. (citation omitted). 
218. Eskridge et al., noting the strength of the federalism canon in Gregory, ask: “Why 
create the canonical equivalent of a nuclear weapon when a fly swatter would have been 
sufficient?” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 934. The answer seems to be that the Court 
calibrates the strength of the clear statement rule to its belief in the importance of the policy 
behind it. 
219. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 948 (citing “fairness to candidates, 
avoiding voter confusion, efficiency in preparing and distributing ballots, and prevention of 
last-minute manipulation” as potential arguments against the Samson court’s opinion). 
220. FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 90 
(2009). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1344476
HASEN 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/1/2009 10:48 PM 
112 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:69 
                                                          
Nonetheless, the two cases are different in that election cases raise greater 
dangers of actual and perceived politicization. In terms of actual politicization, 
“when a court decides important electoral questions on the basis of ‘substantial 
compliance’ rather than the rules, the judges face the serious danger that their 
judgment will be affected by their political preferences.”221  Though there is no 
doubt that the use of the federalism canon in a case like Gregory is affected by 
each Justice’s ideological preference,222  political preferences, even 
subconscious political preferences, do not seem all that germane to the 
decision’s outcome. To the extent we are worried about judges being swayed 
subconsciously by their party politics, we should encourage some judicial self-
reflection before judges rely on the Democracy Canon to engage in liberal 
interpretations of election laws that favor the judge’s own political party. The 
more important protection comes ex ante from legislative drafting. Legislatures 
that write clear rules limit the reach of the Democracy Canon, which no doubt 
has its greatest strength when applied to statutes with large gaps or ambiguities. 
Legislatures can also instruct courts to more strictly construe election statutes. 
Aside from the question of actual judicial bias is a perception problem. 
Substantive canons may be employed regularly as a tool of statutory 
interpretation, but the public does not generally pay attention to, much less 
understand the prevalence of, their use. In the context of a hot-button election 
law case, a court’s use of the Democracy Canon may appear illegitimate and 
result oriented. Recall the public statements of opponents of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Samson.223 
Indeed, for this reason some judges might be reluctant to rely explicitly on 
the Democracy Canon even when it is in play, if there is a more formal or 
technical way, such as through application of a textual canon, to reach the same 
result. That is, judges may be tempted to obfuscate: “Disputes over the 
meaning of abstract Latin phrases, or freestanding policy maxims, may seem 
relatively respectable and law-like not only to scholars but also to judges and 
the attorneys who argue before them.”224  To the contrary, courts should be 
honest and clear when the Canon plays a role, and educate the public both on 
the longstanding nature of the Canon and the on the ability of the legislature to 
avoid court reliance on the Canon through clear statements about the strength 
of deadlines and other election law rules governing voters and their choices at 
elections.225  I concede such education efforts may not be successful, especially 
221. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 398.  
222. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 99 (noting correlation of ideology 
and Supreme Court Justice voting despite use of substantive canons).  
223. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text. 
224. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 99, at 110. 
225. In particular, courts should clearly state that it is fully within the legislature’s 
power to require strict adherence to statutory requirements in election cases. The recent 
Minnesota experience with strict construction of absentee ballots illustrates that courts can 
and will defer to a legislature when the legislature makes clear that the Democracy Canon 
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among partisans on the wrong end of a judicial decision. But the more the 
courts are forthcoming about their policy choices and the more clearly courts 
invite the state legislature to override their decisions in the event of a 
disagreement about the construction of state election law statutes, the better 
chance most of the public will come to accept the decision of the court as 
legitimate. In the end, the legitimacy of the Canon depends a great deal upon 
the possibility of legislative override. 
IV. THE DEMOCRACY CANON, STATE COURTS, AND FEDERAL COURT 
SUPERVISION 
A. Introduction 
In the arguments before the New Jersey Supreme Court in Samson, 
Republicans raised plain meaning and legislative intent arguments against 
allowing Democrats to fill the vacancy in the 2002 U.S. Senate race. After they 
lost at the state level,226  Republicans raised a new argument in the United 
States Supreme Court: the New Jersey Supreme Court, by allowing Democrats 
to fill the vacancy, had usurped the power of the New Jersey Legislature to set 
the rules for congressional elections given to them in Article I, Section 4 of the 
U.S. Constitution.227  The argument followed on the heels of similar arguments 
raised as part of the litigation over the disputed 2000 presidential election in 
Florida.  
The Republicans were unsuccessful in the New Jersey case. The United 
States Supreme Court first denied a stay of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
judgment,228  and then denied a writ of certiorari,229  both without comment or 
dissent. 
This Part examines constitutional questions arising from the use of the 
Democracy Canon by state courts in the context of state statutes regulating 
federal elections. When a state court applies a state statute to a question in a 
federal election, it runs the risk of violating either Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution (vesting in each state legislature the power to set the rules for 
choosing presidential electors) or Article I, Section 4 (vesting in each state 
legislature the power to set the rules for choosing members of Congress, at 
least to the extent Congress has not set such rules). This Part argues that courts 
should not apply. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. When courts make this point 
clear, the press can then explain this point to the general public.  
226. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2002). 
227. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
228. Forrester v. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 537 U.S. 803 (2002). 
229. Forrester v. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 537 U.S. 1083 (2002). 
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should reject arguments that reliance on the Democracy Canon raises Article I 
or Article II concerns. It recognizes, however, a potential due process claim 
that might be raised against state court decisions in a small class of cases where 
a state court relies on the Democracy Canon in an unexpected way not 
consistent with longstanding state jurisprudence or practice. 
B. The Florida 2000 Cases 
 Briefly,230  in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris,231  the 
Florida Supreme Court reversed the Florida Secretary of State’s decisions 
regarding whether to include the results of some of the recounts in electoral 
returns and whether to extend the time for some of the recounts. In reaching 
this decision, the court relied upon a number of principles, including the 
Democracy Canon:  
Because election laws are intended to facilitate the right of suffrage, such laws 
must be liberally construed in favor of the citizens’ right to vote . . . . Courts 
must not lose sight of the fundamental purpose of election laws: The laws are 
intended to facilitate and safeguard the right of each voter to express his or her 
will in the context of our representative democracy. Technical statutory 
requirements must not be exalted over the substance of this right.232 
The court also suggested that the Florida Constitution imposed limits on 
the ability of legislators to enact laws regulating the electoral process: “those 
laws are valid only if they impose no ‘unreasonable or unnecessary’ restraints 
on the right of suffrage.”233 
Republicans argued to the United States Supreme Court that the Florida 
Supreme Court’s opinion, by relying on the state constitution and its liberal 
construction rule, usurped the power of the state legislature to set the rules for 
choosing presidential electors.234  The Supreme Court’s per curiam decision, in 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,235  did not confront the issue 
directly. The Court noted:  
As a general rule, this Court defers to a state court’s interpretation of a state 
statute. But in the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable not 
230. For a more extended legal analysis, see ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 
2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY (2001). 
231. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000). 
232. Id. at 1237 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1227 (“Twenty-five years ago, this 
Court commented that the will of the people, not a hyper-technical reliance upon statutory 
provisions, should be our guiding principle in election cases.”). 
233. Id. at 1236. According to Pamela Karlan, “the Florida Supreme Court relied on 
the Florida Constitution to provide a canon of construction” to liberally construe state 
election law. Pamela S. Karlan, When Freedom Isn’t Free: The Costs of Judicial 
Independence in Bush v. Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 276 (2003). 
234. The next few paragraphs are drawn from Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” 
May Mean More than ‘‘Legislature”: Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of 
Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 611-13 (2008). 
235. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
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only to elections to state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential 
electors, the legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the 
people of the State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. 
II, §1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution.236   
The Court quoted from an 1892 Supreme Court case, McPherson v. 
Blacker,237  to the effect that the key words in Article II “operat[e] as a 
limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the 
legislative power”238  to set the manner for choosing presidential electors. The 
Supreme Court then held that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision “may be 
read to indicate that it construed the Florida Election Code without regard to 
the extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, §1, 
cl. 2, ‘circumscribe the legislative power.’”239  The Supreme Court remanded 
the case “for . . . proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion”240  so that the 
Florida Supreme Court could consider “the extent to which [it] saw the Florida 
Constitution as circumscribing the legislature’s authority under Art. II, §1, cl. 
2.”241 
Eight days after the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Palm Beach County 
Canvassing Board, it decided a second case arising from the Florida 
controversy. Al Gore by this point had contested the results of the election, and 
asked for additional manual recounts of votes in certain Florida counties. A 
Florida trial court judge denied the request for recounts, but the Florida 
Supreme Court reversed, ordering a statewide recount of all the undervotes cast 
in the state in the presidential election, along with other relief.242  The Florida 
Supreme Court ruling depended upon several controversial interpretations of 
Florida’s election statutes, and drew a blistering dissent from the chief justice 
of that court. 
As is well known, in Bush v. Gore243  the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, 
reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling, ending the recount process and 
leading to the choice of George W. Bush over Al Gore as president. A per 
236. Id. at 76. 
237. 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892). 
238. Bush, 531 U.S. at 76 (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25). 
239. Id. at 77.  
240. Id. at 78.  
241. Id. The Court also directed the Florida Supreme Court on remand to explain “the 
consideration the Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U.S.C. §5.” Id. Stripped of the obtuse 
language, the point of the Supreme Court’s first Florida case appeared to be this: Article II 
of the Constitution vests the power for setting the manner of choosing presidential electors in 
the hands of the legislature. In McPherson, the Supreme Court wrote that Article II prevents 
the state from “circumscrib[ing] the legislative power” to set those rules. This principle 
might apply even to limits on legislative power contained in the state’s constitution. Because 
it was unclear whether the Florida Supreme Court read the Florida Constitution’s right to 
vote as trumping the Florida state legislature’s rules for choosing presidential electors, 
remand was in order. 
242. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). 
243. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
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curiam opinion for five Justices held that the recounts ordered by the Florida 
Supreme Court failed to comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and that a remand for recounts under 
acceptable standards was inappropriate (with the result being that Florida’s 
votes would be certified for candidate Bush and he would be declared 
President).244  Four Justices rejected the per curiam opinion.245 
Three of the five Justices signing on to the majority opinion—Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas—wrote separately as well to 
argue that the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion violated Article II. Whereas the 
Article II issue in the first Florida case concerned the question whether the state 
constitution was improperly trumping the state legislature, the question in the 
second Florida case concerned whether the Florida Supreme Court itself was 
improperly trumping the state legislature. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that under Article II “the general coherence 
of the legislative scheme [for the appointing of Florida’s twenty-five electors] 
may not be altered by judicial interpretation so as to wholly change the 
statutorily provided apportionment of responsibility among these various 
bodies.”246  “What we would do in the present case is . . . hold that the Florida 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida election laws impermissibly 
distorted them beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article 
II.”247 
The four Bush v. Gore dissenters took great issue with the view of Article 
II expressed in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence. Justice Stevens wrote: 
[N]othing in Article II of the Federal Constitution frees the state legislature 
from the constraints in the State Constitution that created it. Moreover, the 
Florida Legislature’s own decision to employ a unitary code for all elections 
indicates that it intended the Florida Supreme Court to play the same role in 
Presidential elections that it has historically played in resolving electoral 
disputes. 248 
Similarly, Justice Souter wrote that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation 
was not “unreasonable to the point of displacing the legislative enactment” in 
violation of Article II.249   
244. Id. at 110-11. 
245. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting); Id. at 135 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Two of the Justices in dissent, 
Justices Breyer and Souter, agreed there were constitutional problems with the Florida 
Supreme Court order, but rejected the majority’s decision to end the recounts. The other two 
Justices, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, rejected the equal protection argument.  
246. Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
247. Id. at 115. 
248. Id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.). 
249. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[b]y holding that 
Article II requires our revision of a state court’s construction of state laws in order to protect 
one organ of the State from another, The Chief Justice contradicts the basic principle that a 
State may organize itself as it sees fit.” Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting joined by Stevens, 
Souter & Breyer, JJ.). Justice Breyer wrote that  
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C. The Meaning of the Florida 2000 Cases and Reliance on the Democracy 
Canon by State Courts 
Following the two Florida 2000 Supreme Court cases, there is a 
nonfrivolous argument that Article II of the Constitution prevents state courts 
from relying on the Democracy Canon in interpreting state statutes governing 
the rules that apply to presidential elections.250  The parallel Article I, section 4 
argument (raised in the petition for certiorari in Samson) is that state courts 
cannot rely upon the Democracy Canon in interpreting state statutes governing 
congressional elections. 
One threshold question, not addressed here, is whether the “legislature” 
described in these constitutional provisions really should be considered 
“independent” from the normal state processes of construing election laws.251  
But even if one concedes for purposes of argument that the legislature has the 
sole power to set the rules for presidential elections (or congressional elections, 
subject to congressional override), that does not mean that a state court’s 
reliance on the Democracy Canon is illegitimate. The Bush v. Gore 
concurrence does not claim that state courts are without authority to construe 
election laws affecting presidential elections. This would be an untenable 
position, rendering unreviewable decisions of state agencies (which notably 
also could be seen as usurping the power of the legislature through agency 
interpretation) on how to run a presidential or congressional election, and 
preventing even court supervision of recounts in presidential and congressional 
elections.252  Instead, the concurrence’s argument is that state court 
interpretation cannot “impermissibly distort[] [legislatively drafted election 
laws governing the presidential or congressional election process] beyond what 
a fair reading require[s].”253 
If the operative question is what constitutes “impermissible distortion,” 
neither the text of Article II itself nor the only case the concurrence cites that interprets 
Article II, McPherson v. Blacker [], leads to the conclusion that Article II grants unlimited 
power to the legislature, devoid of any state constitutional limitations, to select the manner of 
appointing electors. . . . Nor, as Justice Stevens points out, have we interpreted the federal 
constitutional provision most analogous to Art. II, §1—Art. I, §4—in the strained manner put 
forth in the concurrence. 
Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., dissenting joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Souter, JJ.). 
250. The Supreme Court has not addressed the meaning of Article II in this context 
since Bush v. Gore. 
251. For an historical argument in the negative, see Hayward H. Smith, History of the 
Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2001). 
252. Indeed,  
the explicit delegation of authority to the [Florida] courts [by the Legislature] suggests the 
expectation that the customary judicial armamentarium will be employed, including reliance 
on a variety of interpretive methods and on all usual sources, including the state constitution. 
Such an inference seems at least as compelling as the contrary, that the legislature intended 
the judiciary to ignore the usual sources of law.  
Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State Constitutional Law in Bush v. 
Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661, 687 (2001).  
253. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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federal courts should hold that state court reliance on the Democracy Canon is 
permissible as a legitimate means of statutory interpretation, at least in those 
states with a long history of reliance on the Democracy Canon.  
Many critics of the Bush v. Gore concurrence, including the dissenting 
Justices, have ably argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
state election laws did not go beyond normal principles of statutory 
interpretation.254  Rick Pildes put it best when he characterized the dispute 
between the Florida Supreme Court and the three concurring Bush v. Gore 
Justices as a battle between textualists and purposivists:  
Faced with ineptly drafted election laws, the Florida Supreme Court took what 
it considered a purposive approach and sought to adapt a statutory scheme, 
written with only state and local recounts in mind, to the context of a 
presidential election. As far as I can tell, this Florida Supreme Court regularly 
engages in purposive interpretation of statutes, in election and many other 
cases. On the other hand, several members of the United States Supreme 
Court fervently believe it is precisely these open-ended methods of purposive 
interpretation that allow courts to impose their own views of desired outcomes 
on statutory schemes; for that reason, these Justices strongly embrace textual 
interpretation. . . . So vehement were these textually committed Supreme 
Court Justices . . . that they excoriated the Florida Supreme Court in the most 
disparaging rhetoric: the Florida court’s readings were “absurd,” ones “[n]o 
reasonable person” would endorse, and “plainly departed from the legislative 
scheme.”255   
In the end, the concurring Justices relied upon their own narrow views of 
appropriate statutory interpretation to find a constitutional problem. This was in 
error. The Supreme Court should defer to a state court’s use of longstanding 
statutory interpretation tools such as the Democracy Canon when faced with an 
Article I or Article II challenge.  
D. A Narrow Federal Role? When State Court Reliance on the Democracy 
Canon Achieves Results Inconsistent with Longstanding Jurisprudence or 
Practice 
Critics of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Samson and of the Florida 
Supreme Court in the 2000 presidential recount argue that federal court 
intervention was necessary to prevent political overreaching by state supreme 
courts.256  However, neither court should be seen as overreaching because each 
254. See Harold J. Krent, Judging Judging: The Problem of Second-Guessing State 
Judges’ Interpretation of State Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 493, 528 n.202 
(2001) (“Even under the concurrence’s standard of ‘beyond what a fair reading required,’ the 
dissenting Justices were on firm terrain in finding that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretations were grounded in the statutory language.”). 
255. Richard H. Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 691, 721 (2001). 
256. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS (2001). For a critique, see Richard L. Hasen, A 
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relied upon longstanding interpretive traditions of the state to construe an 
ambiguous statute or set of statutes either consistent with past practice (as in 
New Jersey) or writing on an essentially blank slate (Florida’s contest 
provisions). Given these longstanding traditions, the better institutional check 
on state court judicial overreaching comes not from the Supreme Court (or 
other federal courts), but from state legislatures themselves. A state legislature 
concerned about state court application of the Democracy Canon in the context 
of federal elections can use clear statements ex ante to negate its application, as 
the Samson court illustrated in its opinion.257 
But what if a state court, in the context of a deeply partisan election 
dispute, suddenly relies upon the Democracy Canon when it has never done so 
before, or relies upon the Democracy Canon to reverse a longstanding practice 
of a state? In such circumstances, whether involving federal, state, or local 
elections, the concern is that the state court is using the Democracy Canon, 
consciously or subconsciously, to reach a particular political outcome. At least 
one federal court, in a troubling case, has held that the practice can violate the 
federal constitutional due process rights of voters or candidates. 
Roe v. Alabama258  involved contested elections for chief justice and state 
treasurer in Alabama. In both of those races, the results were close. Election 
officials, citing Alabama law,259  refused to count the ballots of absentee voters 
who failed to have their ballots notarized or witnessed by two people. Two 
absentee voters who failed to meet this affidavit requirement sued in state court 
to have their votes counted; there were enough of these ballots at stake to 
potentially affect the outcome of both races. A Democratic state court judge 
ordered otherwise complying absentee ballots to be counted despite the failure 
to meet the affidavit requirement.260 
The Republican candidates for chief justice and state treasurer, along with 
other plaintiffs, then filed suit in federal court seeking a preliminary injunction 
“Tincture of Justice”: Judge Posner’s Failed Rehabilitation of Bush v. Gore, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 137 (2001). 
257. Already, the potential Article II issue may drive honest interpretation 
underground. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in the first Florida case, the Florida 
Supreme Court reached the same conclusions about the statutory scheme on remand, but 
excised the portions discussing the Democracy Canon and the state constitution. Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). Issacharoff et al. ask: “Does 
the fact that the Florida Supreme Court reached the same result on remand suggest that state 
constitutional principles had played a role in informing that court’s statutory interpretation, 
but that those principles had not played a decisive role? Or is it a testament to the plasticity 
of legal reasoning?” ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 1058. 
258. 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995). 
259. ALA. CODE § 17-11-7 (1975). 
260. The state circuit court judge was Eugene W. Reese. Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So. 
2d 932, 936 (Ala. 1997) (noting that Judge Reese presided over state court case of Odom v. 
Bennett). Judge Reese ran for judicial office in Alabama as a Democrat. Ala. Sec’y of State, 
2002 Candidate List—All Candidates, http://www.sos.state.al.us/ 
vb/election/2002/allcandidates.aspx?soffice=allcontests&focus=2 (last visited Aug. 29, 
2009).  
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barring Alabama election officials from complying with the state court order. 
The federal district court judge, a Republican appointee, granted the injunction, 
citing the fact that the past practice of Alabama election officials was not to 
count such ballots. A three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, made up of three judges appointed by Republican 
presidents, voted 2-1 to affirm the grant of the preliminary injunction, holding 
that the counting of such ballots could violate the constitutional due process 
rights of the plaintiffs. The panel wrote: 
[A] post-election departure from previous practice in Alabama . . . . would 
dilute the votes of those voters who met [the affidavit requirement] as well as 
those voters who actually went to the polls on election day. Second, the 
change in the rules after the election would have the effect of disenfranchising 
those who would have voted but for the inconvenience imposed by the 
notarization/witness requirement.261   
It then certified to the Alabama Supreme Court the question whether absentee 
ballots not fulfilling the notary or two-witness requirement counted as legal 
ballots.262 
The Alabama Supreme Court, made up of a majority of Democratic judges, 
accepted the case for certification after protesting the federal courts’ intrusion 
into its case.263  “For over 70 years, decisions of this Court have consistently 
construed Alabama’s election laws liberally, where possible, to permit 
Alabama citizens to express their will at the polls.”264  The court cited some of 
the history of use of the Democracy Canon in Alabama, including in cases 
involving non-complying absentee ballots.265  Noting that a majority of 
jurisdictions apply a substantial compliance standard to similar voting laws,266  
and noting that the case contained “[n]o evidence of fraud, gross negligence, or 
intentional wrongdoing,”267  the state supreme court concluded that the ballots 
should be considered legal so long as they contained “the place of residence of 
the person casting the ballot,” “the reason for voting by absentee ballot,” and 
“the signature of the voter.”268 
After receiving the answer from the Alabama Supreme Court, the Eleventh 
Circuit panel nonetheless remanded the case to the federal district court to take 
evidence on prior practice in Alabama regarding the treatment of absentee 
ballots lacking an affidavit.269  The district court conducted a trial, and 
concluded that the prior practice in all but one of Alabama’s electoral 
261. Roe, 43 F.3d at 581. 
262. Id. at 583. 
263. Roe v. Mobile County Appointment Bd., 676 So. 2d 1206, 1217 (Ala. 1995). 
264. Id. at 1221.  
265. Id. at 1224-25.  
266. Id. at 1225; see also id. at 1227 (Appendix A: Majority Jurisdictional Survey).  
267. Id. at 1225. 
268. Id. at 1226. 
269. Roe v. Alabama, 52 F.3d 300 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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jurisdictions was not to count such ballots.270  The Eleventh Circuit then held 
that given this prior practice, the failure to count such ballots could not deny 
the absentee voters their due process or equal protection rights.271  It further 
stated that that the Alabama Supreme Court never passed on the question 
whether the counting of such ballots, in the face of uniform practice not to do 
so, violated the constitutional rights of those voters who complied with the law 
and objected to the counting of non-conforming ballots.272  At that point, the 
case ended with the non-conforming ballots remaining uncounted and the 
challenge to the election rejected. 
What to make of this tortured history? To the federal court and supporters 
of the federal lawsuit, the state courts were engaged in politicized judging: a 
Democratic court helping out Democratic candidates by changing the counting 
rules after the fact. To opponents of federal court intervention, a Republican 
district court judge and Republican panel on the Eleventh Circuit were sticking 
their noses into state court business, and were themselves engaged in 
politicized judging contrary to the longstanding policy of the Alabama courts to 
read election code provisions liberally in favor of the voters.  
Though I am sympathetic to the federal court’s point that changing the 
rules after an election raises real due process concerns, the question is whether 
the state courts indeed “changed the rules.”273  If in fact Alabama courts had a 
long tradition of relying on the Democracy Canon to use “substantial 
compliance” to enfranchise more voters who failed to meet technical 
requirements, then arguably the Alabama courts applied a consistent 
interpretive rule. The difficulty created by the case is that state election 
administration practice and Alabama state jurisprudence did not necessarily 
line up: the practice was never (or almost never) to count non-conforming 
absentee ballots; but the Alabama Supreme Court opinion in Roe implicitly 
assumed that this longstanding practice could be overturned by courts if asked 
to do so under the courts’ consistent application of the Democracy Canon.274 
Though the federal court intervention may well have been warranted in 
these circumstances—any time an election rule goes against voters’ and 
candidates’ settled expectations and universal practices, it raises legitimate 
270. Roe v. Mobile County Appointing Bd., 904 F. Supp. 1315, 1335 (S.D. Ala. 1995).  
271. Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404, 407-08 (11th Cir. 1995). For more context on the 
case, see Edward Felsenthal, Justice Delayed: A Year After Election, Alabama’s Chief Judge 
and His Foe Battle On—As Vote Counts and Rulings Come and Go, Real Issue Is Policy on 
Tort Reform—‘Everyone is Just Disgusted,’ WALL. ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at A1.  
272. Roe, 68 F.3d at 409.  
273. For a case in which a state supreme court changed the rules to exclude absentee 
ballots that voters had an expectation would be counted, see Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 
1075-76 (1st Cir. 1978). Pildes discusses the Eleventh Circuit’s Roe opinions and Griffin in 
the context of federal courts reviewing “new law” created by state courts. See Pildes, supra 
note 255, at 701-13. 
274. At least I am assuming it is a consistent application of the Democracy Canon. If, 
instead, the court showed a pattern of applying the Canon inconsistently to reach partisan 
results, this would present a more forceful case for federal court intervention. 
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fairness concerns—ex ante action by the state legislature would have been far 
superior. A legislature worried about judicial overreaching could pass election 
statutes that not only clearly state their mandatory and non-waivable nature, but 
also indicate that such statutes should be strictly construed against expansive 
voter rights. In the end, the federal court intervention may have made the entire 
episode even more politicized than it was initially. But it does suggest the 
legitimacy of a narrow federal role in policing use of the Democracy Canon 
when state court reliance on the Canon is inconsistent or in violation of settled 
expectations. 
CONCLUSION  
In the 2004 mayoral race runoff in San Diego, California, incumbent 
mayor Dick Murphy defeated his opponent, Ron Roberts, and write-in 
candidate Donna Frye. Murphy beat Frye by an official difference of 2108 
votes out of 450,000 votes cast.275  After the election, a review of the ballots 
turned up thousands of ballots in which voters wrote in the name of Donna 
Frye but that were not counted for Frye because those voters did not also fill in 
a “bubble” on the optical scan ballot indicating they were casting a write-in 
vote.276  If all of the Frye votes were counted, she would have defeated Murphy 
by 3443 votes.277 
Supporters of Frye brought suit, arguing that the election should be 
overturned in Frye’s favor. A state trial court disagreed,278  citing a provision 
of the California Elections Code stating that “[f]or voting systems in which 
write-in spaces appear directly below the list of candidates for that office and 
provide a voting space, no write-in vote shall be counted unless the voting 
space next to the write-in space is marked or slotted as directed in the voting 
instructions.”279  Frye’s supporters pointed out that the San Diego municipal 
code, in contrast, did not provide that voters had to fill in a “bubble” for the 
vote to count; it was enough to write in the name of the write-in candidate.280  
Moreover, San Diego had recently adopted this new voting technology 
following lawsuits over its electronic voting system; voters were unfamiliar 
with the means of filling in the bubbles and some argued that the instructions 
on how to cast a write-in vote were not clear.281 
Frye’s supporters eventually dropped their appeal when Murphy resigned 
275. Greg Moran, Re-Election of Murphy Will Stand, Judge Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-




279. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15342(a) (West 1998). 
280. Moran, supra note 275. 
281. See Richard L. Hasen, The Mayoral Election: Off to Court We Likely Go, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 17, 2004, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/ 
20041217/news_lz1e17hasen.html. 
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for reasons unrelated to the lawsuit.282  Had the case gone to appeal, the 
appellate court should have seriously considered applying the Democracy 
Canon because the state elections code provision was ambiguous. True, it did 
provide that filling in the bubble is mandatory (“no write-in vote shall be 
counted unless . . . .”). But it also stated that the bubble must be filled in “as 
directed in the voting instructions.” If the voting instructions were not clear, 
there would be ample room to liberally construe the law in favor of the voters. 
Moreover, a court facing this kind of issue should consider applying the 
contrary municipal law. In considering the statutory issues, the court should at 
least consider reading the statutes as expressing “the intention . . . to obtain an 
honest expression of the will or desire of the voter.”283 
The Democracy Canon will not resolve all election law disputes. But it 
says that at least when a statute is not clear, the law should favor the voters and 
their enfranchisement. Voters should not be “lost in legal brambles.”284  This is 
a venerable principle, and one that all courts should embrace as a legitimate 
canon of construction in election law cases. At the very least, when state courts 
embrace the principle in a consistent and longstanding way, federal courts 





282. Greg Moran, Court Case on Behalf of Frye Votes is Dropped, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., May 13, 2005, at A1. 
283. State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 51 (Fla. 1940). Even if the statutory 
interpretation argument failed, Frye supporters could have raised a state constitutional 
argument. After Bush v. Gore, California voters enacted a constitutional amendment 
guaranteeing the right to vote. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2.5 (“A voter who casts a vote in an 
election in accordance with the laws of this state shall have that vote counted.”). 
284.  Nance v. Kearbey, 158 S.W. 629, 639 (Mo. 1913).  
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